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DECONSTRUCTING INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
(AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES)
Kirti Datlat & Richard L. Revesztt
Volumes have been written-both by courts and commentators-about
the so-called independent agencies. These agencies are thought to be distinct
from executive branch agencies and constitutionally insulated from presiden-
tial influence. Yet few have paused to ask what features make an agency
"independent" as opposed to "executive." To answer that question, this Arti-
cle systematically surveys administrative agencies for a broad set of indicia of
independence: removal protection, multimember structure, partisan balance
requirements, budget and congressional communication authority, litigation
authority, and adjudication authority. This Article also examines the func-
tional dfferences between independent and executive agencies. As it turns
out, there is no single feature, structural or functional, that every agency
thought of as independent shares-not even the for-cause removal provision
commonly associated with independence. We therefore reject the binary dis-
tinction between independent and executive agencies. Instead, all agencies
should be regarded as executive and seen as falling on a spectrum from more
independent to less independent. From this new understanding of adminis-
trative agencies flows a simple theory of presidential control: A President can
take any action with respect to an agency (assuming it is within his Article II
powers) unless Congress has prohibited that action by statute (in a manner
that does not encroach upon the President's Article II powers). There is no
tenable argument tojustify an extra layer of constitutional or statutory limits
to presidential interaction with agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Regulatory commissions were invented during the Progressive
Era and designed to bring expertise-driven decision making to the ad-
ministrative state. The commissions were insulated from outside influ-
ence through structural features such as specified terms of tenure and
bipartisan membership requirements.' More agencies, by then re-
1 See MarshallJ. Breger & GaryJ. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation
of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1128-36 (2000) (describing theory
behind the creation of the first federal independent agencies-the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-and giving "the basic orga-
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ferred to as "independent agencies," were created during the New
Deal.2 Generally defined as entities whose heads enjoy (or are be-
lieved to enjoy)3 for-cause removal protection,4 these agencies include
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB), and Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC). At the same time, the purpose of these agencies'
structural features was recharacterized from promoting expertise to
fostering independence from the President. Later, the 1935
Humphrey's Executor v. United States decision added a layer of constitu-
tional protection to the agencies' existing structural protections from
presidential control.6
But by the 1960s, it became clear that these agencies faced the
same pathologies, such as capture and poor decision making, as exec-
utive agencies.7 And so, the pendulum swung back and increased
presidential influence was offered up as a means to realign these agen-
cies with the public interest.8 This proposal raised the question of
nizational model for the modern [multimember] independent agency"); JAMES M. LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 111 (1938).
2 See Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1116 & n.14 (listing agencies created during the
Progressive Era and the New Deal, including the Federal Reserve Board (1913), FTC
(1914), Federal Radio Commission (1927), Federal Power Commission (FPC) (1930), SEC
(1934), Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (1934), National Labor Relations
Board (1935), Bituminous Coal Commission (1935), and Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC) (1936)).
3 See infra text accompanying note 54.
4 This is the common definition of independent agencies. See infra note 24 and ac-
companying text. This Article challenges this generally accepted dichotomy between inde-
pendent and executive agencies.
5 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2) (A) (2006) (CFTC); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (SEC); 29
U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (NLRB).
6 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
7 See GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAw AND PROCEDURE 327-42 (1924) (concluding that the new Federal Trade Com-
mission had achieved "meagre results" despite its promise because, among other things, "it
cannot be expected that a government commission .. . can command the services of those
super-men whose decisions are always made of the substance ofjustice and wisdom"); John
F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technol-
ogy of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1071, 1112-19 (2000) (describing the "disillusion-
ment" with independent agencies that began in the 1960s and the major "dissolution" of
regulatory agencies in the late 1970s); Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The
Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 506-07 (1952) (attributing
congressional attacks on the Interstate Commerce Commission to the agency's capture by
the railroads); Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century,
1889-1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 94-97 (2004) (describing the reasoning and conclu-
sions of the 1937 Brownlow Report, which criticized independent agencies for being irre-
sponsible and unaccountable); see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1678-88 (1975) (discussing the criticism that
agencies fail "to carry out legislative mandates and to protect the collective interests" and
identifying potential causes of these failures, including capture).
8 See generally SuBcoMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 86TH CONG., REP. ON
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 35-87 (Comm. Print 1960) (written by
James M. Landis) (discussing the structural and organizational problems with many agen-
7712013]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
whether and to what extent increased presidential control could be
retrofitted onto agencies thought to be insulated from such control.9
Underlying this discussion, and almost all discussions, of inde-
pendent agencies are three fundamental assumptions. First, agencies
can be divided into two identifiable, distinct sets: independent and
executive. Second, the presence of certain characteristics defines the
members of each set. And third, those characteristics justify the ac-
companying legal rules governing the President's ability to interact
with each type of agency. These assumptions are incorrect.
Agencies cannot be neatly divided into two categories. Indepen-
dent agencies are almost always defined as agencies with a for-cause
removal provision limiting the President's power to remove the agen-
cies' heads to cases of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office."10 But, as some scholars acknowledge, the so-called indepen-
dent agencies do not share a single form." This Article is the first to
systematically survey the enabling statutes of both independent and ex-
ecutive agencies for a broad set of indicia of independence: removal
protection, specified tenure, multimember structure, partisan balance
requirements, litigation authority, budget and congressional commu-
nication authority, and adjudication authority.' 2 It finds that there is
no single feature-not even a for-cause removal provision-that every
agency commonly thought of as independent shares.13 Moreover,
many agencies generally considered to be executive agencies exhibit
at least some structural attributes of independence. This Article also
examines the functional differences between independent and execu-
tive agencies. Here too, the differences are overstated.
cies and concluding that "executive action promises more expeditious handling of many of
(those major problems]"); AM. BAR Ass'N, COMM'N ON LAW & THE ECON., FEDERAL REGULA-
TION: ROADS To REFORM 78-80 (1979) (calling for increased presidential oversight of regu-
latory agencies). See also Louis L. Jaffe, The Independent Agency-A New Scapegoat, 65 YALE
L.J. 1068, 1074 (1956) (reviewing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESs BY INDEPEN-
DENT COMMISSION (1955)) ("[I] t seems to me sounder on balance that these policy-making
agencies should be subject to presidential control.").
9 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional De-
sign, 89 TEx. L. REv. 15, 31, 32 n.81 (2010) (collecting academic sources that state that the
permissible extent of presidential control over independent agencies is an open question).
10 Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383; see infra text accompanying
notes 25-27.
11 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 51 ("It is not
entirely clear exactly what features of the independent regulatory commissions are essen-
tial and what are merely incidental.").
12 Over a decade ago, Professors Marshall Breger and Gary Edles conducted half of
this survey-of the independent agencies-and reached the conclusion that independent
agencies do not share a common form. See generally Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at
1137-54. Others have made the comparison across types of agencies, but only in passing
and on the basis of few examples. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 11, at 43-44; Peter L. Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 CoLUM. L.
REv. 573, 583-87 (1984).
1 See infra Tables 1-7.
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So, agencies do not fall neatly into two categories. If the binary
view of agencies is incorrect, what is the correct view? The continuum
view. Agencies fall along a continuum ranging from most indepen-
dent from presidential influence to least independent. The so-called
independent agencies are simply a type of executive agency. To be
sure, they are insulated from presidential authority, but so are many
executive agencies.
The current rules governing the President's interactions with
agencies stem from the binary view of agencies. Status as an indepen-
dent agency carries limitations on presidential control that reach be-
yond those specified in the statute. For example, whether the
President can require agencies with for-cause removal protection to
submit regulations to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) for review is an open question. 4 And agencies have argued
that the presence of some indicia of independence-such as a multi-
member structure and a set term of tenure-imply additional indicia
of independence-such as for-cause removal protection or the ability
to bypass the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and present
a budget directly to Congress.' 5 Finally, there is a sort of constitu-
tional force field around independent agencies. The consensus view
is that presidents cannot constitutionally involve themselves in inde-
pendent agency decision making to the same extent as executive
agency decision making, though the contours of that rule are
unclear.' 6
Implying additional constraints on presidential control over an
agency beyond those specified in an agency's enabling statute is a mis-
take. Our argument rests on both statutory interpretation and consti-
tutional analysis. On the statutory front, the diversity of agency form
should affect the way we think about agencies. When designing an
agency, Congress has a set of tools it can use to make the agency more
or less independent from the President. To infer an additional fea-
ture of independence from the presence of another feature of inde-
pendence, one must assume that Congress intended to include it,
even though it did not do so explicitly. But because no one feature of
independence perfectly correlates with another, there is no reason
14 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 9, at 31-32, 32 n.81; Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sun-
stein, A New Executive Orderfor Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1534-35 (2002); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Ci. L. REv. 1, 28-32 (1995).
15 See infra notes 342-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of a line of cases
addressing whether to imply a for-cause removal provision on the basis of a multimember
structure and terms of tenure, and for a discussion of an attempt by the FTC to assert its
exemption from executive budgets and legislative clearance requirements on the basis of
its status as an independent agency with for-cause removal protection.
16 See Barkow, supra note 9, at 32 n.81 (collecting academic sources stating that the
permissible extent of presidential control over independent agencies is an open question).
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why any given statutory limitation, or set of limitations, on presidential
power should generate additional limitations not provided for by stat-
ute.17 Article II of the Constitution assigns the executive power to the
President, so a clear statement is generally required when Congress
chooses to limit this power." This rule should not be different for the
so-called independent agencies.
On the constitutional front, implied limitations on the Presi-
dent's power over independent agencies depend on the implicit as-
sumption that independent agencies have some special status under
the Constitution. The idea would be that when Congress gives an
agency for-cause removal protection, it places that agency in a special
constitutional category that comes with additional protections against
presidential control.'9 However, the Constitution provides for no
such "fourth branch."20 And because not all of the indicia of indepen-
dence are present in all agencies with for-cause removal protection,
the congressional purpose argument does not hold up. There is no
reason to believe that Congress means for agencies to have special
constitutional protection from presidential control when it chooses
not to grant those same agencies full or uniform statutory protection
against such control.
Thus, the current set of rules governing presidential interactions
with the so-called independent agencies are flawed because they are
based on a flawed premise. We argue instead for a simpler rule: the
President can constitutionally take any action with respect to indepen-
dent agencies that he could with respect to the executive agencies un-
less a statutory provision says otherwise.
This Article ends with three applications of this rule. First, we
argue that because Congress can-and does-create agencies with
many different combinations of indicia of independence, any indicia
that are not in the enabling statute should not be read into that stat-
ute. We believe that Wiener v. United States,21 a case in which the Su-
preme Court implied for-cause removal protection into a silent
17 See Miller, supra note 11, at 52 n.49 ("When the idea of independent agencies is
taken as having some content other than the various specific restrictions on presidential
control, then it becomes extremely tempting to draw broader-and misleading-distinc-
tions between independent and executive branch agencies.").
18 See infra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Account-
ing Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861) (question of Roberts, C.J.) ("The
formulation that you use and your friend the Solicitor General ... used is that [presidents]
have the same authority [over the SEC, which lacks an explicit for-cause removal clause]
that they have over every other independent agency, but I'm-it's very hard to find out
exactly what that authority is. So what is your position about the authority of the
President?").
20 See infra notes 321-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "fourth
branch" theory of independent agencies.
21 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
774 [Vol. 98:769
2013] DECONSTRUCTING INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
statute, and lower court decisions that later relied on Wiener are incor-
rect. Second, agencies cannot claim more independence from the
President than Congress granted them in their enabling statutes by
wrapping themselves in the mantle of independent-agency status. Just
because Congress has given an agency a certain measure of indepen-
dence from the President, it does not follow that the courts should
imply that the agency enjoys additional measures of independence.
Third, we argue that the President can require all agencies to submit
to the regulatory review process. If he does, Congress can of course
exempt agencies from the regulatory review requirement, just as it has
done in response to previous presidential assertions of control over
the administrative state.22
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development of
the binary view of agencies. Parts II and III then explain why the bi-
nary view is incorrect. Part II surveys the enabling statutes of both
independent and executive agencies for seven indicia of indepen-
dence: removal protection, specified tenure, multimember structure,
litigation authority, partisan balance requirements, budget and con-
gressional communication authority, and adjudication authority. It
establishes that both independent and executive agencies have indicia
of independence. Part III shows that the relationship between the
President and independent agencies is not all that different in prac-
tice from the relationship between the President and executive agen-
cies. Independent agencies, despite their name, are somewhat
dependent on the President. And many executive agencies enjoy sig-
nificant independence from the President. Finally, Part IV presents
the core of our argument: An agency does not gain more insulation
from the President than Congress provided for in the agency's gov-
erning statute simply because of its categorization as an "indepen-
dent" agency. The Supreme Court dicta and robust literature that
treat independent agencies as a "headless fourth branch" must there-
fore be abandoned. We end with three applications of our theory.
I
BINARY VIEW OF AGENCIES As EITHER INDEPENDENT
OR EXECUTIVE
The modern administrative state is extraordinarily complex.
There are "many different kinds of administrative structures, exercis-
ing different kinds of administrative authority, to achieve [different]
legislatively mandated objectives." 23 Despite this diversity of form and
function, the conventional wisdom is that there are two types of agen-
22 See infra notes 197-218 (describing the pattern of presidential consolidation of
power and the exemption from that exercise of presidential power by Congress).
23 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3169 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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cies: executive and independent. Each type of agency comes with a
set of rules that govern how the President can interact with them. The
consensus view is that the dividing line is the presence of a for-cause
removal protection clause,24 but not all agencies considered indepen-
dent possess such a clause. If independent agencies are truly distinct
from executive agencies, there must be another dividing line. This
Part explains the development of the binary view of agencies. Parts II
and III then demonstrate that the binary view lacks a statutory and
real-world basis because that dividing line does not exist.
A. Brief History of the Independent Agency Form
Congress established the first independent agency, the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC), in 1887.25 Five commissioners, ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
ran the agency. No more than three of those five commissioners
could be from the same political party.26 Commissioners served six-
year staggered terms and could be removed from office by the Presi-
dent for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."27
Commissioners could not be employees of the railroads, which the
ICC regulated, or own financial interests in the railroads.28 The ICC
was originally located within the Department of Interior,29 a location
that did not appear to be incompatible with "whatever independence
24 See, e.g., Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1138 & n.131 ("The critical element of
independence is the protection-conferred explicitly by statute or reasonably implied-
against removal except 'for cause.'"); Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAw 333, 347 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph
O'Connell eds., 2010) ("Independence is a legal term of art in public law, referring to
agencies headed by officials that the President may not remove without cause. Such agen-
cies are, by definition, independent agencies; all other agencies are not."); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2376 (2001) (defining the President's
removal power as "the core legal difference" between independent and executive agen-
cies); John 0. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901,
953-54 (2001) (defining independent agencies as "agencies whose heads do not serve at
the pleasure of the president"); Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Inde-
pendent Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 461, 470 n.39 (1994) ("Immunity from dis-
cretionary removal power is a 'condition sine qua non' of independence."); Cass R.
Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 426 (1990) ("An agency is
independent if Congress has provided that its members can be discharged by the President
only for specified causes."); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation ofPowers, the Rule of Law and the Idea
of Independence, 30 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 301, 330 (1989) ("The condition that makes the
independent agency truly independent is a statutory restriction on removal for cause."); see
also Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 28-33 (discussing how to interpret for-cause re-
moval provisions to allow inclusion of independent agencies within regulatory review).
25 See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383.
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 See id.
29 See id. § 21, 24 Stat. at 387.
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the new commission was supposed to have."30 Congress eventually
moved the ICC out of the Department of Interior and made it a stand-
alone agency.3 '
The debates over the structure of the ICC did not mention the
term "independence," and "the intent was not to make the commis-
sion independent and thereby vest it with authority to wield power
outside the domain of the executive branch."3 2 The view that inde-
pendent agencies could be a bulwark against the expansion of presi-
dential power came later in the 1930s. 3 3 Initially, the primary goal of
the independent agency structure was expert, impartial decision
making. 34
This goal of impartial expertise motivated many of the structural
features of the early independent agencies. Commissioners and
board members were appointed for a term of years because expert-
ness "springs only from that continuity of interest, that ability and de-
sire to devote fifty-two weeks a year, year after year, to a particular
problem."35 Congress created new agencies to avoid the inertia and
capture of existing cabinet departments, and to allow the new agen-
cies to focus on narrow subject areas without consideration of compet-
ing programmatic interests.3 6 A single agency with a single mission
could be held responsible for its actions, and this accountability would
be a draw for "men whose sole urge for public service is the opportu-
nity that it affords for the satisfactions of achievement."3 7 Insulation
from political control would also increase the attractiveness of employ-
ment at the agencies, thereby ensuring that policies would be less
shortsighted at inception and more stable over time.38 Finally, Con-
gress authorized these agencies to act through adjudication to ap-
pease a hostile judiciary. Courts at the time were wary of regulations,
and the hope was that they would more willingly uphold decisions
30 ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 62 (1941).
31 See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 382, §§ 7-8, 25 Stat. 855, 861-62.
32 Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1130.
33 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 53 (noting that during the 1930s, influential mem-
bers of Congress saw independent agencies "as a device for counteracting the trend toward
concentration of power in the executive branch under a strong president").
34 See Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1131.
35 LANDIS, supra note 1, at 23.
36 See id. at 26-28.
37 Id. at 28.
38 See HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BET-
TER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 153 (1962) (noting that too much presidential control over
agency decision making would "defy the lesson that it is responsibility that breeds achieve-
ment"); see also LANDIS, supra note 1, at 111 ("[T]here seems to have been a hope that the
independent agency would make for more professionalism than that which characterized
the normal executive department. Policies would thus be more permanent and could be
fashioned with greater foresight than might attend their shaping under conditions where
the dominance of executive power was pronounced.").
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made by a body that "operated more like a court than an administra-
tive agency."39
B. Development of the Binary View of Agencies
Independent agencies soon gained constitutional status as the
"[flourth [b]ranch."40 The content of that status is unclear, but the
basic idea seems to be that because these agencies are outside the
executive branch, the President cannot constitutionally attempt to in-
terfere with their decisions.
The basis for the constitutional status of independent agencies
stems not from constitutional text but from enduring dicta in the
1935 case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States.41 Indeed, there is no
mention of administrative agencies, much less independent agencies,
in the Constitution.42 The constitutional status of the independent
agency comes instead from Humphrey's Executor, where the Court held
that Congress could constitutionally limit the President's removal
power over agencies that performed quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative
functions.43
The Humphrey's case arose when President Roosevelt attempted to
remove a FTC commissioner based only on their policy disagree-
ments." The Court believed that Congress's intent in granting com-
missioners for-cause removal protection was to ensure that the FTC
would not be "subject to anybody in the government" or "subject to
the orders of the President."45 The FTC was to be "independent of
executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judg-
ment," and removal at will by the President would "thwart, in large
measure, the very ends which Congress sought to realize by definitely
fixing the term of office."46 The constitutional protection from presi-
39 BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 27-29 (discussing the relationship between adjudication
and the history of judicial hostility toward administrative decisions).
40 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 525-26 (2009) ("There
is no reason to magnify the separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the headless Fourth
Branch . . . by letting Article III judges-like jackals stealing the lion's kill-expropriate
some of the power that Congress has wrested from the unitary Executive." (citations
omitted)).
41 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
42 See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(describing the terms "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative" used to justify the existence of
independent agencies within the constitutional scheme as merely "a smooth cover [courts]
draw over [their] confusion as [they] might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered
bed").
43 See 295 U.S. at 628-29.
44 See id. at 618-19.
45 Id. at 625.
46 Id. at 625-26.
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dential control given to independent agencies stems from these few
sentences. 4 7
The Court read into the structure of the FTC a congressional de-
sire that the agency be "free from executive control."48 It then de-
scribed the agency as situated outside the other three branches. The
agency was "not only wholly disconnected from the executive depart-
ment, but . . . was created by Congress as a means of carrying into
operation legislative and judicial powers, and as an agency of the legis-
lative and judicial departments."49 In short, the Court endorsed the
idea that Congress, when it creates an agency with for-cause removal
protection, intends for the agency to be totally free from presidential
influence, aside from the President's role in appointments.5 0
After Humphrey's Executor, agencies were classified as either inde-
pendent or executive. Independent agencies are fully protected from
presidential influence by both their statutory features and this extra
layer of constitutional protection. Executive agencies are fully con-
trolled by the President. This view of agencies had at least three
consequences.
First, agencies that shared some, but not all, of the FTC's struc-
tural features claimed to be fully independent, that is, to enjoy for-
cause removal protection. After the decision, for-cause removal pro-
tection "became a symbol of independence for all members of similar
regulatory independent agencies and commissions."5 1 Agencies that
had similar features, such as a multimember structure and set terms of
tenure, claimed for-cause removal protection despite lacking such a
provision in their enabling statutes.5 2 Their argument was that if an
47 See STEVEN G. CAIABRESI & CHIUSTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDEN-
TIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 425 (2008) ("It was thus not until ... Humphrey's
Executor v. United States that there was even a colorable claim that these commissions were
in any way independent of the president.").
48 Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628.
49 Id. at 630. This language sets up a distinction that the Humphrey's Executor Court
drew between the FTC and the postmaster at issue in Myers v. United States, in which the
Court declared that "[t]he power of removal is incident to the power of appoint-
ment, ... and when the grant of the executive power is enforced by the express mandate to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it emphasizes the necessity for including
within the executive power as conferred the exclusive power of removal." 272 U.S. 52, 122
(1926).
50 See Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 629 ("The authority of Congress, in creating quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties
independently of executive control . . . includes . .. [the power] to forbid their removal
except for cause in the meantime. For it is quite evident that one who holds his office only
during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of inde-
pendence against the latter's will.").
5I J. Forrester Davison, The Place of the Federal Trade Commission in Administrative Law, 8
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 280, 287 (1940).
52 See, e.g., FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("The
commission suggests that the President can remove the commissioners only for good
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agency looks more like an independent agency than a traditional ex-
ecutive agency, Congress must have intended it to be independent.53
The omission of a for-cause removal protection provision must have
been a drafting error. Courts willingly followed, implying for-cause
removal protection for the SEC and the Federal Election Commission
(FEC).5 Even when there is no court decision on point, some agen-
cies without for-cause removal provisions have historically been
treated as independent, such as the SEC, the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC), the FCC, and the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA).56
Second, some independent agencies claimed additional insulat-
ing features not provided for by statute. For example, the FTC
claimed it was not subject to the centralized budget-making process
run by the President.56 The agency argued that presidential control
of an agency's budget ran contrary to the congressional purpose de-
scribed in Humphrey's Executor because such control amounted to "pol-
icy control of at least one 'independent' agency by the Executive
through the power of the purse."57
Finally, greater presidential control over these agencies was seen
as constitutionally suspect because it is incompatible with the general
congressional desire, described in Humphrey's Executor, to insulate
agencies from presidential control. This view persisted even though
scholars and former heads of independent agencies acknowledged
the benefits, even the necessity, off such control. But the content of
the constraint on presidential control is unclear.59 For example,
cause, which limitation is implied by the Commission's structure and mission as well as the
commissioners' terms."); SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir.
1988) ("[The court] accept[s] appellants' assertions in their brief, that it is commonly
understood that the President may remove a commissioner only for 'inefficiency, neglect
of duty or malfeasance in office.'").
53 See, e.g., NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d at 826; Blinder, 855 F.2d at 681.
54 See infra notes 349-53 and accompanying text.
55 See Paul R. Verkuil, jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 CoLuM. L. REv. 943, 954 n.65 (1980) (noting that the holding in Wiener v. United
States presumably extends to other independent agencies without explicit for-cause re-
moval protection); see also infra note 91 (citing circuit court cases).
56 See Arthur Krock, In the Nation: The 'Independence' of the Federal Agencies, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1958, at 22; see also infra notes 366-68 and accompanying text.
57 Krock, supra note 56, at 22.
58 See generally Philip Elman, The Regulatory Process: A Personal View, 39 ANTITRUST L.J.
901 (1970); Louis J. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions,
69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960); Newton N. Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative
Process, 15 ADMIN. L. REv. 146 (1963).
59 See, e.g.,Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol,
47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1595, 1601 (1997) (describing independent agencies as "somewhat
less susceptible to direct presidential control than are executive branch agencies"); Peter
L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38
ADMIN. L. REv. 181, 203 (1986) (describing independent agencies as "somewhat remote
from presidential direction").
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scholars seem to draw a line between procedural supervision over in-
dependent agencies, which is acceptable, and substantive control,
which they find troubling.60 Professors Peter Strauss and Cass Sun-
stein give two examples of procedural requirements: "requiring con-
sultation or the preparation of particular documents, such as cost-
benefit statements."6' They do not define substantive control, but
presumably it would involve orders, or possibly even simple recom-
mendations, as to specific policy outcomes.62 The current Supreme
Court seems to share this discomfort with substantive presidential con-
trol. For example, at the oral argument in Free Enterprise Fund, Justice
Anthony Kennedy expressed skepticism that the President could "on
an ongoing, daily basis . . . instruct an independent agency what he
wants done," and Justice Antonin Scalia declared that the extent of
the President's control over the SEC was "nothing."63
C. Challenging the Binary View
The idea that the " [i] ndependent agencies occupy a different le-
gal and political space than executive-branch agencies" rests on the
assumption that all agencies can be categorized as either independent
or executive. 64 But as explained above, there is not a definition-not
even for-cause removal protection-that encompasses all agencies
thought of, and treated, as independent.65 Yet, using for-cause re-
60 See, e.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 203 ("[T]o say that the President
cannot dictate outcomes is not to resolve the question whether the President can impose
requirements that are procedural in character . ..
61 Id.
62 It goes without saying that this distinction between process and substance, in addi-
tion to being indeterminate, is also probably incorrect. For the argument that administra-
tive procedures are used as instruments of political control, that is, to increase the
likelihood of certain substantive outcomes, see Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 254 (1987);
Matthew[sic] D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Ar-
rangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 431-32 (1989).
63 Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Over-
sight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861).
64 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future ofAgency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REv. 599, 600 (2010).
65 The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) is a statute designed to ease information col-
lection costs on the public, and the government defines "independent regulatory agency"
for the purposes of the Act. The definition includes a list of agencies followed by the
catchall phrase, "and any other similar agency designated by statute as a Federal indepen-
dent regulatory agency or commission." Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C.
§ 3502(5) (2006). The Act allows "independent regulatory agenc[ies]" with two or more
members to override the OMB's informational request vetoes. Id. § 3507(f) (1).
Along with being outdated (one of the listed agencies, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, for example, no longer exists), the list is also vague. The listed agencies do not
share a uniform structure, so it is not clear whether there is a unifying theme that one
could extract from the list. One of the agencies is a single-member agency, some do not
have explicit for-cause removal protection, and there are multimember agencies with ex-
plicit for-cause removal protection not included in the list. See infra Tables 1-3.
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moval protection as the dividing line remains the consensus view
among scholars. 66
Scholars stress the importance of for-cause removal clauses even
while acknowledging that not all agencies they treat as independent
possess this feature. For example, Professors Breger and Edles exten-
sively surveyed thirty-two agencies they classify as independent.6 7 They
found that these agencies varied with respect to number of members,
length of terms, and bipartisanship requirements,68 and they settled
on removal protection as "[t]he critical element of independence."6 9
Yet, of the agencies surveyed, only seventeen enjoy explicit for-cause
removal protection. Breger and Edles suggest that the other agencies
enjoy "reasonably implied" for-cause protection but do not clarify the
trigger for implying such protection or why that implication is justi-
fied.70 Some scholars acknowledge that other features influence the
categorization of agencies as independent but then treat removal as
the most important feature of independence without explaining its
weight. Professor Geoffrey Miller argues that independent agencies
almost uniformly display several characteristics: a multimember struc-
ture, a bipartisanship requirement, rulemaking authority, adjudica-
tion authority, enforcement authority, a narrow mandate, and
removal protection.71 Of these, Miller believes that the "limits on
presidential removal are distinctive."72 However, Miller reached this
conclusion without examining the other six features to explain why
removal is the most indicative of independence.'8
Three recent pieces shift away from the focus on for-cause re-
moval protection toward a more comprehensive analysis of what
makes an agency independent. In Insulating Agencies, Professor
Rachel Barkow notes that independent agencies are created not sim-
ply to insulate agency decisions from presidential influence, but also
to protect them from capture by interest groups and partisan influ-
ence in general.74 Because regulatory capture led, at least in part, to
the recent financial crisis,75 Barkow advocates for an increased em-
phasis on structural features that can insulate agencies from capture,
66 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
67 See Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1236-94.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 1138.
70 Id. We take issue with implying for-cause removal protection in the absence of a
statutory provision in Part IV.A.
71 See Miller, supra note 11, at 51.
72 Id.
73 Though Professor Miller acknowledges that the other factors may raise constitu-
tional issues, he quickly dismisses them, in part because they "do not distinguish indepen-
dent agencies from traditional executive branch agencies." Id.
74 See Barkow, supra note 9, at 19-26.
75 See id. at 72-78.
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such as funding sources, appointment qualification requirements, and
consultation requirements.76
Professors Bressman and Thompson make a similar move in their
piece, The Future of Agency Independence. They describe several mecha-
nisms through which independent agencies have become more re-
sponsive to presidential preferences. 7 Some of these mechanisms are
statutory. For example, the authors point to the Independent Pay-
ment Advisory Board (IPAB), created by the Affordable Care Act.7 8
IPAB members enjoy for-cause removal protection and are responsi-
ble for devising plans to keep Medicare costs low. 79 But the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, not IPAB, must implement
those plans.80 This separation of planning and execution is novel ac-
cording to the authors, and it "blur[s] some of the usual lines" be-
tween independent and executive agencies."' Other mechanisms are
informal. The authors note that the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
and the Secretary of the Treasury have had a "public partnership," in
which both have worked together to address functional stability and
reform, since the end of the Bush administration.8 2 By examining
these mechanisms, the authors take a step toward undermining "the
binary distinction that long has been understood to exist between in-
dependent and executive-branch agencies."83
In Removal as a Political Question, Professor Aziz Huq challenges
the assumption that the removal power results in complete presiden-
tial control over an agency.8 4 He points out that there are many struc-
tural features, substantive delegations of authority, and combinations
thereof that affect how much control presidents have over an
agency.85 From that he draws several conclusions. First, the marginal
increase in presidential control from removal power will be lower for
an agency that is already insulated from presidential control in other
ways.86 Second, the removal power can sometimes have negative ef-
fects on presidential control.87 Because of these complexities, he ar-
gues that courts should treat removal power as a political question.
These pieces are a much-needed contribution to the study of
agency independence. However, they do not answer the underlying
76 See id. at 42-55.
77 See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 64, at 600.
78 See id. at 662.
79 See id. at 662-63.
80 See id.
81 Id. at 663.
82 See id. at 624-30.
83 Id. at 672.
84 Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2013).
85 See id. at 25-32.
86 See id. at 33-36.
87 See id. at 36-38.
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question of what exactly makes an agency independent and justifies
the independent agencies' different constitutional and political status.
To try to answer this question, Part II takes up Professor Miller's
charge "to 'deconstruct' the agencies into their constituent elements
of independence." 8 Rather than simply surveying agencies tradition-
ally considered to be independent, we systematically examine both the
executive and independent agencies for seven indicia of indepen-
dence: removal protection, specified tenure, multimember structure,
partisan balance requirements, litigation authority, budget and con-
gressional communication authority, and adjudication authority.89
II
INDEPENDENT AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES:
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
The goal of this Part is to demonstrate that the binary distinction
between independent and executive agencies is false. To that end, we
examine seven indicia of independence traditionally associated with
independent agencies. For each feature, we construct a two-by-two
matrix. We first divide agencies into two categories: agencies with an
explicit for-cause removal provision and agencies without an explicit
for-cause removal protection. The set of eighty-one agencies studied
is taken from the 2011 United States Government Manual, an annually
updated document that provides detailed information on the federal
government.90 We then examine whether each feature is present
across those two categories of agencies. The matrices demonstrate
88 Miller, supra note 11, at 44. As discussed above, Professor Miller did not follow
through on his charge; rather, his piece challenged the constitutionality of removal protec-
tion. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
89 These seven features are in no way an exclusive list. Other features, such as inde-
pendent funding sources, location within another agency, qualification requirements for
appointments, and consultation requirements can impact independence. See, e.g., Barkow,
supra note 9, at 42-45 (describing the effects of an independent funding source, require-
ments for expertise rather than ideological agreement, and pressure or support from other
agencies on agency insulation); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARv. L. REv. 1131, 1173-81 (2012) (describing presidential oversight
of agency coordination); Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of
Appointment: The Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV.
L. REv. 1822, 1831-38 (2012) (examining the impact of an independent funding source
on presidential and congressional control over agencies). We chose to focus on the struc-
tural features most commonly associated with independence.
90 OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER NAT'L ARCHIVEs & RECORDs ADMIN., THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT MANuAL, at v-ix (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
GOVMAN-2011-10-05/pdf/GOVMAN-2011-10-05.pdf. We included every agency on the
"Executive Branch: Departments" and "Executive Branch: Independent Agencies And Gov-
ernment Corporations" lists. We did not include agencies housed within other agencies
(for example, the United States Patent and Trademark Office, which is housed within the
Department of Commerce) unless the agency enjoyed for-cause removal protection: those
agencies were the FERC and the Surface Transportation Board (STB)). Several agencies
were dropped because details from their enabling statutes could not be found in the U.S.
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that each of the features most often associated with for-cause re-
moval-and therefore with independence-are also present in non-
independent agencies. Moreover, for-cause removal is not correlated
with the presence of every other indicia of independence; rather,
agencies within the category of agencies with for-cause removal pos-
sess different combinations of other indicia of independence.
Some preliminary explanation is in order. The discussion up to
this point has made it clear that, on the basis of the removal provi-
sions, there are three relevant categories: (1) agencies with explicit
for-cause removal protection, (2) agencies believed to have such pro-
tection either because a lower court has implied such protection or
because the agency has traditionally been treated as independent, and
(3) agencies for which statutory silence with respect to removal is
taken to mean removal at will. For the purposes of this Part, we divide
agencies into only two categories: those with explicit for-cause removal
protection and those without such protection. We recognize that this
second category will contain agencies whose independence has been
implied or assumed by lower courts (e.g., the SEC and FEC), 91 agen-
cies generally considered to be independent (e.g., the FCC), 92 and
agencies that are clearly executive (e.g., the Department of State).
But we believe that the explicit for-cause removal protection dividing
line is the least arbitrary. This is because, as explained in Part I.C,
there is no definitive list of agencies that fall within the category of
independent agencies. If the tables were reconstructed to include
agencies commonly considered independent-such as the SEC, FEC,
and CFTC-in the "statutory removal protection" section of the ta-
bles, our conclusion that the binary distinction between independent
Code. These agencies include the National Railroad Passenger Corporation and the Inter-
American Foundation.
From the list of forty-nine "Boards, Commissions, and Committees," we added the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board, National Council on Disability, and Panama Canal Commission. We also added the
Election Assistance Commission (EAC), IPAB, and Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC)-commonly known agencies that did not appear on those lists. Finally, we added
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which did not gain authority to oper-
ate until after the manual was published.
91 Lower courts have implied for-cause protection for the FEC and the SEC. See FEC
v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 88
(1994); SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988). The D.C.
Circuit avoided the issue with respect to the National Credit Union Administration in Swan
v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[W]e will assume arguendo that Board mem-
bers have removal protection during their appointed terms and focus instead on determin-
ing whether, even if that is so, holdover members are similarly protected."). The parties'
briefs in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, assumed that the SEC
enjoyed for-cause removal protection. See 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148-49 (2010).
92 It should be obvious why this category is impossible to define. The first question
would be to ask whose treatment counts. The second would be what the indicia of "tradi-
tionally treated" would be.
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and executive agencies is incorrect would still hold. Moreover, as we
argue in Part IV.C, we do not believe that the presence of other indi-
cia of independence implies the presence of for-cause removal protec-
tion as well.
A. Removal Protection
As reported in Table 1, of the eighty-one agencies studied, twenty-
three agencies possess a statutory removal protection provision and
fifty-eight do not. This subsection explores the scope of statutory re-
moval provisions and explains how the presence of varying levels of
removal protection might affect the President's ability to influence
agency decision making.
TABLE 1: AGENCIES WITH STATUTORY REMOVAL PROTECTION
CFPB; Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; Commission on Civil Rights;
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC); FERC; Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA); Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA); FMC; Federal Reserve; FTC; IPAB;
Statutory Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB); Mine Safety and Health Review Commission;
Removal NLRB; National Mediation Board (NMB); National Transportation Safety Board
Protection (NTSB); Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission (OSHRC); Office of Special Counsel (OSC); Postal Regulatory Com-
mission (PRC); Social Security Administration (SSA); STB; United States Postal Service
(USPS)
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS); Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation; African Development Foundation; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);
CFTC; Corporation for National and Community Service; Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board; Department of Agriculture; Department of Commerce; Department of De-
fense (DOD); Department of Education (ED); Department of Energy (DOE); Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS); Department of Homeland Security (DHS);
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Department of the Interior;
Department ofJustice (DOJ); Department of Labor; Department of State; Department of
Transportation (DOT); Department of the Treasury; Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA); Election Assistance Commission; Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Equal
No Statutory Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); Export-Import Bank; Farm Credit Ad-
Removal ministration; FCC; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); FEC; Federal Media-
Protection tion and Conciliation Service; Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board; General Ser-
vices Administration (GSA); International Broadcasting Bureau; MCC; National Aero-
nauics and Space Administration (NASA); National Archives and Records Administra-
tion (NARA); National Capital Planning Commission; National Council on Disability;
National Credit Union Administration; National Endowment for the Arts (NEA); Nation-
al Endowment for the Humanities (NEH); National Science Foundation (NSF); Office of
Government Ethics; Office of Personnel Management (OPM); Office of the Director of
National Intelligence; Overseas Private Investment Corporation; Panama Canal Commis-
sion; Peace Corps; Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation; Railroad Retirement Board;
SEC; Selective Service; Small Business Administration (SBA); Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA); U.S. Trade and Development Agency United States International Trade Com-
mission (ITC); US Agency for International Development (USAID)
9 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (c)(3) (2006) (CFPB); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (6) (B) (2006) (Chemi-
cal Safety and Hazard Investigation Board); 42 U.S.C. § 1975(e) (2006) (Commission on
Civil Rights); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2006) (CPSC); 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (b) (1) (2006) (FERC);
12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(2) (2006) (FHFA); 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b) (2006) (FLRA); 46 U.S.C.
§ 301(b)(3) (2006) (FMC); 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (Federal Reserve); 15 U.S.C. § 41
(2006) (FTC); 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(g) (4) (Supp. 2010) (IPAB); 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2006)
(MSPB); 30 U.S.C. § 823(b) (1) (2006) (Mine Safety and Heath Review Commission); 29
U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (NLRB); 45 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (NMB); 49 U.S.C. § 1111(c)
(2006) (NTSB); 42 U.S.C. § 5841(e) (2006) (NRC); 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (2006) (OSHRC);
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The ability to remove an agency head at will is an enforcement
tool that helps the President ensure that the agency follows his policy
preferences. 4 Of course, at-will removal is a blunt instrument for en-
forcing presidential preferences. 95 Any decision to remove an agency
head will impose political costs on a President.96 These costs will vary
according to the reason for the removal, the popularity of the Presi-
dent, the popularity of the agency head, and other factors.97 A Presi-
dent will therefore remove an agency head only when the political
benefits exceed the political costs. Insulation from presidential re-
moval significantly increases the political costs of a decision to remove
an agency head for a President because invoking a for-cause provision
will make the removal more politically salient and susceptible to judi-
cial challenge.98
The exact meaning of for-cause protection clauses is uncertain.
The typical removal protection clause specifies that an official can be
removed only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in of-
fice."99 But it is not clear what actions are removable offenses because
the Supreme Court has not decided a case defining those terms.100
Some scholars read the Court's removal jurisprudence as permitting a
certain degree of presidential control over independent agencies. For
5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (2006) (OSC); 39 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006) (PRC); 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3)
(2006) (SSA); 49 U.S.C. § 701 (b)(3) (2006) (STB); 39 U.S.C. § 202(a)(1) (2006) (USPS).
94 See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 20 (2d ed. 1960) (describing re-
moval as the "gun behind the door" that allows the President to require agency heads to
follow his lead).
95 See Entin, supra note 59, at 1595 ("The power to remove has limited real-world
significance . . . .").
96 See Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1349, 1381 (2012).
97 See id. at 1380-82; see also Miller, supra note 11, at 87 (describing the "considerable
political costs" that President Richard Nixon suffered after removing officers who refused
to comply with his policy preferences); Verkuil, supra note 55, at 957 (noting the political
costs associated with removing an officer who has strong supporters in Congress or influen-
tial interest groups).
98 See Barkow, supra note 9, at 30 ("A removal restriction undoubtedly gives an agency
head greater confidence to challenge presidential pressure."). But see Breger & Edles,
supra note 1, at 1149-50 (describing how regulatory commissioners generally acquiesce to
a President's resignation request or fail to challenge their removal); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The
Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593,
604-05 (speculating that many "voluntary resignations" were the result of presidential pres-
sure, despite a for-cause removal requirement).
99 See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383; see also supra note 24 (listing
scholars who consider such for-cause removal protection clauses the defining feature of
independence).
100 See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUm. L. REv. 1, 110 (1994) ("But the Court has not said what 'good cause' means. The
Court has also failed to define 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office'-the
ordinary standards for presidential removal of members of the independent
commissions.").
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
example, Professors Richard Pildes and Sunstein suggest that the text
of removal clauses might allow Presidents to discharge agency heads
that frequently act "in incompetent ways" or make "consistently fool-
ish policy choices."10
Different language in different removal clauses might indicate
different levels of removal protection. Statutes that specify that an ap-
pointee cannot be removed except for "good cause"10 2 confer the
weakest protection. Statutes that protect the appointee from removal
except in cases of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in of-
fice" confer stronger protection.103 Finally, the statute at issue in Free
Enterpise Fund conferred protection against removal unless members
willfully violated the Sarbanes Oxley Act, rules of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, or other securities laws; willfully abused
their authority; or failed to perform their duties without reasonable
justification. 0 4 The Supreme Court called this form of protection "an
unusually high standard." 05 Assuming a President wished to test his
powers of supervision through an attempt at dismissal, "[t]he weaker
the standard, the less specific the grounds for removal are and the
more room the President has to interpret the standard and thus con-
trol the officer."' 06 But the differences between these removal clauses
have limited practical effect. No recent President has attempted to
remove the head of an independent agency for cause, or at the very
least, no such attempt has led to litigation that resulted in judicial
interpretation of the terms in a removal protection clause. 0 7
The procedural requirements of removal also vary. For example,
the President may remove members of the FLRA and the NLRB only
after notice and a hearing. 0 The other statutes that grant for-cause
101 Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 30.
102 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1) (2006) (stating that an independent counsel may be
removed "only for good cause, physical or mental disability[,] .. . or any other condition
that substantially impairs [the independent counsel's] performance").
103 See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 30 (interpreting this standard as granting
the President some degree of procedural supervision).
104 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7217(d) (3) (2006).
105 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3158
(2010).
106 Barnett, supra note 96, at 1373.
107 President George H. W. Bush, during his last few months in office, threatened to
remove the Board of Governors of the USPS during a dispute over the agency's statutory
authority to litigate independently of the DOJ. See Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia issued a preliminary injunction against the President, the DOJ filed a motion for rever-
sal, and the conflict carried over into President Clinton's first term. See id. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ended the litigation when it ruled, after analyzing the rele-
vant statutes, that the USPS did have the authority to litigate independently. See id. at 515.
Therefore, there was no opportunity for the court to reach the question of whether the
President could have removed the Board of Governors.
108 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b) (2006) (FLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (NLRB).
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protection do not require such procedures. In practice, the exact sub-
stance of the removal provision does not seem to matter. The lack of
litigation around the subject suggests that presidents err on the side of
caution. This caution extends even further to agencies without for-
cause removal clauses that are still thought to possess such protection,
such as the SEC.109
Though not studied in detail here, it is worth noting that Con-
gress can still choose to impose costs on the President without confer-
ring for-cause protection. Congress sometimes requires the President
to communicate his reasons for removal. For example, the President
may remove the Inspector General of the Department of State and the
Foreign Service, but the "President shall communicate the reasons for
any such removal to both Houses of Congress."110 The requirement
of notification decreases the chance that any attempt at removal
might go unnoticed, thereby increasing the political risks involved.
For example, the existence of such a requirement contributed in part
to the successful decision of the Comptroller of the Currency, who at
the time was a Department of the Treasury employee, to ignore a pres-
idential directive."
B. Specified Tenure
Table 2 reports whether agency heads serve for a specified term
of years. For agencies marked by an asterisk, an administrator other
than the head of the agency serves for a specified term of years. As
shown in the Table, a roughly equal number of agencies without for-
cause removal protection have heads that serve for a term of tenure.
While some of those are commonly considered "independent," such
as the SEC and FCC, others are not, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Na-
tional Endowments.
109 See WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AcENCIES 10 (1967) ("As to
removal of commissionersL,] ... there is no express limitation on the power of the Presi-
dent in connection with the FCC, FPC, and SEC as well as other agencies. However,
doubts as to legal power, coupled with the political inadvisability of such a traumatic step,
reduce the efficacy of this form of Presidential control.").
110 22 U.S.C. § 3929(a) (2) (2006); see also 10 U.S.C. § 139(a)(1) (2006) (same for Di-
rector of Operational Test and Evaluation in the Department of Defense); 35 U.S.C.
§ 3(a) (4) (2006) (same for the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property
and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); 44 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (2006) (same
for Archivist of the United States).
II See CARY, supra note 109, at 101-03.
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TABLE 2: AGENCIES WITH SPECIFIED TENURE
Tenure Specified Tenure Not Specified
CFPB; Chemical Safety and Hazard Investi-
gation Board; Commission on Civil Rights;
Statutory CPSC; FERC; FHFA; FLRA; FMC; Federal
Removal Reserve; FTC; IPAB; Mine Safety and None
Protection Health Review Commission; MSPB; NMB;
NLRB; NRC; NTSB; OSC; OSHRC; PRC;
SSA; STB; USPSI 12
ACUS; Advisory Council on Historic Pres-
ervation; African Development Founda-
tion; CFTC; Corporation for National and
Community Service; Defense Nuclear Facil- ment of Agme cultrE; Depart-
ities Safety Board; DOD*; DHS*; DOJ*; ment of me;E; De; H ;
DOT*; VA*; Election Assistance Commis- Department of ab or; Depart
sion; EEOC; Export-Import Bank; Farm
No Statutory Credit Administration; FCC; FDIC; FC- ment of the Treasury; EPA; Federal Media-
,tion and Conciliation Service; GSA; Inter-
Removal Federal Retirement Thrift Investment national Broadcasting Bureau; NASA;
Protection Board; International Trade Commission
(ITC); MCC; National Capital Planning nA;Olice of the Comsaion
Commission; National Council on Disabili- Ielligence;;PanasaoCanaleCotmGssion;
ty; National Credit Union Administration; P or
NEA; NEH; NSF; Office of Government Corpoation; Selective Service; SBA; U.S.
Ethics; OPM; Overseas Private Investment Trade and Development Agency; USAID
Corporation; Railroad Retirement Board;
CSEC;ITVAA1 3  D
112 See 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(1) (2006) (CFPB, five-year terms); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (r) (6) (B) (2006) (Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, five-year terms);
42 U.S.C. §m1975(c) (2006) (Commission on Civil Rights, six-year terms); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2053 (a) (2006) (CPSC, seven-year staggered terms); 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (b) (1) (2006)
(FERC, five-year staggered terms); 12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(2) (2006) (FHFA, five-year terms);
5 U.S. C. § 7104 (c) (2006) (FLRA, five-year terms); 46 U.S.C. § 301 (a) (2) (2006) (FMC,
five-year staggered terms); 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006) (Federal Reserve, fourteen-year stag-
gered terms); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) (FTC, sevtn-year staggered terms); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395kkk(g)(2) (Supp. 2010) (IPAB, six-year staggered terms); 30 U.S.C. § 823(b) (1)
(2006) (Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, six-year staggered terms); 5 U.S.C.
§ 1202(a) (2006) (MSPB, seven-year terms); 45 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (NMB, three-year
terms); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (NLRB, five-year staggered terms); 42 § U.S.C. 5841 (c)
(2006) (NRC, five-year staggered terms); 49 U.S.C. § n D l(c) (2006) (NTSB, five-year
terms); 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (2006) (OSC, five-year terms); 29 § U.S.C. 661(b) (2006)
(OSHRC, six-year staggered terms); 39 U.S.C. § 502( (2006) (PRC, six-year terms); 42
U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (2006) (SSA, six-year terms); 49 U.S.C. § 701(b)(3) (2006) (STB, five-
year terms); 39 U.S.C. § 202(b)(1) (2006) (USPS, sevenFyear staggered terms).
113 5 U.S.C. § 593(b) (2006) (ACUS, chairman, five-year terms); 16 U.S.C. § 470i(c)
(2006) (Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, four-year staggered terms); 22 U.S.C.
§ 290h-5(a) (2) (2006) (African Development Foundation, six-year staggered terms); 7
U.S.C. § 2(a) (2) (2006) (CFC, five-year staggered terms); 42 U.S.C. § 12658a(c) (2006)
(Corporation for National and Community Service, five-year terms); 42 U.S.C. § 2286(d)
(2006) (Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, five-year staggered terms); 10 U.S.C.
§ 3037(a) (2006) (DOD, Navy judge Advocate General, four-year terms); 49 U.S.C.
§ 114(b)(3) (2006) (DHS, Transportation Security Agency Director, five-year terms); 28
U.S.C. § 532 (2006) (DOJ, FBI Director, ten-year terms); 49 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006) (DOT,
Federal Aviation Administration Administrator, five-year terms); 38 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (2)
(2006) (VA, Chairman of the Veterans' Appeals Board, six-year terms); 42 U.S.C.
§ 15323(b) (1) (2006) (Election Assistance Commission, four-year staggered terms); 42
U.S.C. § 20Se-4(a) (2006) (EEOC, five-year terms); 12 U.S.C. § 635a(c)(8)(A) (2006)
(Export-Import Bank, four-year staggered terms); 12 U.S.C. § 2242(b) (2006) (Farm
Credit Administration, six-year staggered terms); 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2006) (FCC, five-year
terms); 12 U.S.C. § 1812(c) (2006) (FDIC, six-year terms); 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(2)(A)
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The effect of a term of tenure varies depending on the presence
of other structural features. A term of tenure standing alone serves
several purposes. First, a term of tenure ensures that the Senate will
have a chance to review an officer's performance. For example, Presi-
dent Barack Obama decided to retain President George W. Bush's
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates when he took office. 114 That deci-
sion was not subject to Senate approval, as there is no tenure limita-
tion for the Secretary of Defense. In contrast, when President Obama
decided to reappoint Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke to a
second four-year term in 2010, he faced a political battle that threw a
spotlight on the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve's han-
dling of the financial crisis.' 15 Second, and closely related, the deci-
sion to remove an officer before the end of a specified term imposes
at least some costs on a President. A tenure protection "at least in-
hibit[s]" a President from "arbitrarily dismissing an [officer] for politi-
cal reasons" because a President would have to explain his departure
from the default term of office to the Senate when he nominated a
successor.116 The term might signal that the position is less political,
which also limits the potential pool of nominees available to the Presi-
dent.117 Third, insulation from political influence may increase with
term length because the need to secure renomination is less fre-
(2006) (FEC, six-year staggered terms); 5 U.S.C. § 8472(e) (2006) (Federal Retirement
Thrift Investment Board, four-year staggered terms); 19 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (2006) (ITC,
nine-year staggered terms); 22 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (4) (2006) (MCC, three-year terms); 40
U.S.C. § 8711(b) (3) (2006) (National Capital Planning Commission, six-year staggered
terms); 29 U.S.C. § 780(b)(1) (2006) (National Council on Disability, six-year staggered
terms); 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(c) (2006) (National Credit Union Administration, six-year stag-
gered terms); 20 U.S.C. § 954(b)(2) (2006) (NEA, four-year terms); 20 U.S.C. § 956(b) (2)
(2006) (NEH, four-year terms); 42 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006) (NSF, six-year terms); 5 U.S.C.
app. 4 § 401(b) (2006) (Office of Government Ethics, five-year terms); 5 U.S.C. § 1102(a)
(2006) (OPM, four-year terms); 22 U.S.C. § 2193(b) (2006) (Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, three-year staggered terms); 45 U.S.C. § 231f(a) (2006) (Railroad Retirement
Board, five-year terms); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (SEC, staggered five-year terms); 16
U.S.C. § 831a(d) (2006) (TVA, five-year terms).
114 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Gates Vows Active Role in Staying On at Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2008, at A20.
115 See Sewell Chan, Fed Chief Wins a Second Term Despite Critics, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 29, 2010,
at Al (describing the confirmation fight as "an arm-twisting campaign by the
administration").
116 122 CONG. REc. 23,809 (1976) (statement of Sen. Robert C. Byrd); see also Ten-Year
Term for FBIDirector: Hearing on S. 2106 Before the Subcomm. on FBI Oversight of the S. Comm. on
thejudiciary, 93rd Cong. 24 (1974) (statement ofJohn T. Elliff, Assistant Professor, Dep't of
Politics, Brandeis Univ.) ("[T]he effect of the 10-year term is to create an expectation as to
what should constitute a normal period of tenure for the FBI Director. There is a binding
quality about any fixed time period.").
117 See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change Restraining the Pre-
sent to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1153, 1214 (2009) ("A longer term of appoint-
ment also sends a strong message to Congress that this is not a standard political
appointment, but rather one that warrants a more searching inquiry into a nominee's
background and expertise for such a position.").
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quent.118 Professor Barkow argues that this feature is especially desir-
able for agencies that carry out economic agendas, a task that "often
requires politically unpopular actions in the short term.""t9
A term of tenure combined with removal protection serves sev-
eral other purposes. First, terms of tenure foster expertise and con-
tinuity. 120 Longer terms of tenure will allow officers to gain
experience in the subject matter of the agency.121 Those officers can
then transfer that knowledge to newly appointed colleagues.122 The
trade-off is that with longer tenure comes an increased risk of depen-
dence on staff and capture by interest groups. 123 Second, longer
terms cut across presidential administrations, a feature that is in-
tended to make the officer "transcend political loyalty to the current
presidential administration."' 24 If a President appoints a member
whose term will continue into the next President's administration, the
appointing President will not be able to use the incentive of reap-
pointment to wield influence over the member.
C. Multimember Structure
As reported in Table 3, most agencies with statutory removal pro-
tection are run by multimember bodies, and there are roughly the
same number of multimember agencies without statutory removal as
single-headed agencies without the removal protection.
118 REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw SPECIAL
COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, reprinted in 58 AwN.
TRUST L.J. 43, 124 (1989) (noting that a change from seven-year terms to five-year terms for
FTC commissioners "might reduce the independence of commissioners interested in long
tenures by requiring more frequent renomination"). In multimember bodies, shorter
terms ensure that presidents can appoint a chair of their choice early in their first term.
See id. at 123.
119 Barkow, supra note 9, at 29.
120 See FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at 157 ("[A]n important value of the independent
agency is to maintain a fair degree of continuity . .
121 See Barkow, supra note 9, at 29.
122 See id. (noting that in multimember agencies, "the terms of the members must be
staggered so that institutional expertise can accumulate without gaps").
123 Cf Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Over-
seeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1655, 1734 (2006) (describing this
trade-off for tenure on congressional committees).
124 Lazarus, supra note 117, at 1213; see also Ten-Year Term for FBI Director: Hearing on S.
2106 Before the Subcomm. on FBI Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 1 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Robert C. Byrd) (explaining that a ten-year term was preferable to a
seven-year term because the seven-year term "could fall within the Presidency of the man
who originally appointed the [official]," but with a ten-year term, the official "can be more
effectively insulated from political pressures .. . and he will not be considered a politically
oriented member of the President's 'team'").
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TABLE 3: AGENCIES Wrm MULTIMEMBER STRUCTURES
Single-Headed Structure Multimember Structure
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Statutory Board; Commission on Civil Rights; CPSC;
Removal CFPB; FHFAo OsC sA 12 5  FERC; FMC; Federal Reserve; FLRA FlTC;
Protection IPAB; Mine Safety and Health Review Com-
mission; MSPB; NLRB; NMB; NRC; NTSB;
OSHRC; PRC; STB; USPS 126
CIA; Department of Agriculture; Department
of Commerce; DOD; ED; DOE; HHS; DHS; ACUS; Advisory Council on Histrc Preserva-
HUD; DOJ; Department of Labor; Depart- ton; African Development Foundation;
ment of State; Department of the Interior; De- TC; Corporation for National and Commu-
partment of the Treasury; DOT; VA4 Office of nity Service; Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
No the Director of National Intelligence; EPA; EoC; EpotiortanF CreitsAd-
Statutory Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service;
Removal GSA; International Broadcasting Bureau; ministration; FCC; FDIC, FEC; Federal Retire-
Protection NASA; NARA, NEA- NEH; NSF; Office of Gov- ment Thrift Investment Board; ITC; MCC; Na-
ernment Ethics; OPM; Office of the Director tional Capital Planning Commission; National
of National Intelligence; Peace Corps; Pension Council on Disability National Credit UnionAdministration; Overseas Private InvestmentBenefit Guaranty Corporation; Selective Ser- Corporation; Panama Canal Commission;
vice; SBA, U. Trade and Development Agen- R 28
ACU;cy; USAID 1 2 advisorymonc on StC PsA
125 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (b) (1) (2006) (CFPB, Director); 12 U.S.C. § 4512(b) (1) (2006)
(FHFA, Director); 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (2006) (OSC, Special Counsel); 42 U.S.C.
§ 902 (a) (1) (2006) (SSA, Commissioner).
126 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (6) (2006) (Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
five members, President appoints Chair with Senate confirmation); 42 U.S.C. § 1975
(2006) (Commission on Civil Rights, eight members, President and Congress each appoint
four members, President appoints Chair with consent from majority of members); 15
U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2006) (CPSC, five commissioners, President appoints Chair); 42 U.S.C.§ 7171 (b)(a)(5) (2006) (FERC, five commissioners, President appoints Chair); 46 U.S.C.
§ 301 (b)U(1) (2006) (FMC, five commissioners, President appoints Chair); 12 U.S.C.
§§ 241-42 (2006) (Federal Reserve, seven members, President appoints Chair for four-year
term with Senate consent); 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (2006) (FLRA, three members, President ap-
points Chair); 15 U.S.C. § 41(2006) (FTC, five commissioners, President appoints Chair);
42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(g) (Supp. 2010) (IPAB, ftfteen members, President appoints Chair
with Senate confirmation); 30 U.S.C. § 823(a) (2006) (Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission, five commissioners, President appoints Chair); 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1203 (2006)
(MSPB, three members, President appoints Chair with Senate confirmation); 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(a) (2006) (NLRB, five members, President appoints Chair); 45 U.S.C. § 154 (2006)
(NMB, three members, members annually select Chair); 42 U.S.C. § 5841 (a) (2006) (NRC,
five commissioners, President appoints Chair); 49 U.S.C. § 11(b), (d) (2006) (NTSB,
five members, President appoints Chair with Senate confirmation); 29 U.S.C. § 661(a)
(2006) (OSHRC, three commissioners, President appoints Chair); 39 U.S.C. § 502 (2006)
(PRC, five commissioners, President appoints Chair); 49 U.S.C. § 701 (2006) (STB, three
members, President appoints Chair); 39 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (USPS, eleven members, Pres-
ident appoints nine governors with Senate confirmation, governors appoint Chair).
127 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(a) (2006) (CIA, Director); 7 U.S.C. § 2202 (2006) (Department
of Agriculture, Secretary); 15 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006) (Department of Commerce, Secretary);
10 U.S.C. § 113 (2006) (DOD, Secretary); 20 U.S.C. § 3411 (2006) (ED, Secretary); 42
U.S.C. § 7131 (2006) (DOE, Secretary); 42 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006) (HHS, Secretary); 6
U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006) (DHS, Secretary); 42 U.S.C. § 3532(a) (2006) (HUD, Secretary); 28
U.S.C. § 503 (2006) (DOJ, Attorey General); 29 U.S.C. § 551 (2006) (Department of La-
bor, Secretary); 22 U.S.C. § 2651 (2006) (Department of State, Secretary); 43 U.S.C. § 1451
(2006) (Department of the Interior, Secretary); 31 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2006) (Department of
the Treasury, Secretary); 49 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (DOT, Secretary); 38 U.S.C. § 303
(2006) (VA, Secretary); 50 U.S.C. § 403 (2006) (Director of National Intelligence); 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) (EPA, Administrator); 29 U.S.C. § 172(a) (2006) (Federal Mediation
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Multimember agencies are different than single-headed agencies
in three main ways. First, a multimember structure can foster more
deliberative decision making, a higher level of expertise, and con-
tinuity of policy.' 29 Group deliberation leads to better-informed and
reasoned policy outcomes from the agency.' 30 The downside that ac-
companies increased deliberation is the "slowness inherent in group
action."13' Second, multimember agencies allow for the development
of institutional memory. The members of most multimember agen-
cies serve staggered terms, which means that the members' terms ex-
and Conciliation Service, Director); 40 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006) (GSA, Administrator);
22 U.S.C. § 6206(b) (2006) (International Broadcasting Bureau, Director); 51 U.S.C.
§ 20111 (2006) (NASA, Administrator); 44 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (2006) (NARA, Archivist); 20
U.S.C. § 954(b)(1) (2006) (NEA, Chair); 20 U.S.C. § 956(b)(1) (2006) (NEH, Chair); 42
U.S.C. § 1861 (2006) (NSF, Director); 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 401(b) (2006) (Office of Govern-
ment Ethics, Director); 5 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2006) (OPM, Director); 50 U.S.C. § 403(a)(1)
(2006) (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Director); 22 U.S.C. § 2503(a)
(2006) (Peace Corps, Director); 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006) (Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, Director); 50 U.S.C. app. § 460 (a) (1) (2006) (Selective Service, Director); 15
U.S.C. § 633(b) (2006) (SBA, Administrator); 22 U.S.C. § 2421(b)(1) (2006) (U.S. Trade
and Development Agency, Director); 22 U.S.C. § 6592 (2006) (USAID, Administrator).
128 5 U.S.C. § 593(b) (2006) (ACUS, 75 to 101 members, President appoints Chair
with Senate confirmation); 16 U.S.C. § 470i(a) (2006) (Advisory Council on Historic Pres-
ervation, twenty members, President appoints Chair); 22 U.S.C. § 290h-5 (2006) (African
Development Foundation, seven members, President appoints Chair); 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) (2) (A), (B) (2006) (CFTC, five commissioners, President appoints and Senate con-
firms Chair); 42 U.S.C. § 12651a (2006) (Corporation for National and Community Ser-
vice, fifteen members, members appoint Chair); 42 U.S.C. § 2286(b) (2006) (Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, five members, President appoints Chair); 42 U.S.C.
§ 15323(a) (1) (2006) (Election Assistance Commission, four members, members annually
appoint Chair); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2006) (EEOC, five members, President appoints
Chair); 12 U.S.C. § 635a(c) (2006) (Export-Import Bank, five members, President ap-
points CEO with Senate confirmation); 12 U.S.C. § 2242(a) (2006) (Farm Credit Adminis-
tration, three members, President appoints Chair); 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006) (FCC, five
commissioners, President appoints Chair); 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006) (FDIC,
five directors, President appoints Chair for five-year term with Senate confirmation);
2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (2006) (FEC, six commissioners, commissioners appoint Chair);
5 U.S.C. § 472 (2006) (Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, five members, Presi-
dent appoints Chair); 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a), (c) (2006) (ITC, six members, President ap-
points Chair of a different party than prior Chair); 22 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2006) (MCC, nine
members, Secretary of State serves as Chair); 40 U.S.C. § 8711 (2006) (National Capital
Planning Commission, five members, President appoints Chair); 29 U.S.C. § 780(a), (c)
(2006) (National Council on Disability, fifteen members, President appoints Chair); 12
U.S.C. § 1752a(b) (2006) (National Credit Union Administration, three members, Presi-
dent appoints Chair with Senate confirmation); 22 U.S.C. § 2193 (2006) (Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, fifteen directors, President appoints President with Senate confir-
mation); 22 U.S.C. § 3612 (2006) (Panama Canal Commission, nine members); 45 U.S.C.
§ 231f(a) (2006) (Railroad Retirement Board, three members, President appoints Chair
with Senate confirmation); 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006) (SEC, five commissioners, President
appoints Chairman); 16 U.S.C. § 831a (2006) (TVA, nine members, members select
Chair).
129 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 70.
130 See id.
131 Id.
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pire at different times.' 32 This structure allows a transfer of
knowledge from the existing members to newly appointed members.
Third, the stability of membership leads to the continuity of policies.
A multimember agency structure, assuming the members serve their
full terms, 33 will not be immediately influenced by changes in Presi-
dential administrations. When a President takes office, a multimem-
ber agency will contain some members appointed by prior presidents.
This feature insulates the agency from the political preferences of a
new President until he is able to make enough appointments to influ-
ence the decisions of the agency. 134
The recent debate over the structure of the CFPB highlights the
benefits and costs of a multimember structure. In December 2011,
the Senate blocked the confirmation of President Obama's nominee
to head the CFPB, a newly created agency whose head enjoys for-cause
removal protection.135 Those who voted against confirmation did so
because they view the current structure of the CFPB as unacceptable.
One of their objections is to the single-director structure; they instead
prefer a multimember agency.' 36 Their argument is that a switch to a
multimember agency would ensure that "rules are fair, consistent and
balanced, and [would] promote certainty and continuity."13 7 Of
course, it is likely that the opposition to a single-headed CFPB also
stems from disagreement with the content of the regulations that the
agency is expected to produce. For opponents of such regulations, a
multimember agency might take longer to issue regulations or be una-
ble to reach consensus.138
132 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) (FrC, seven-year staggered terms); id. § 78d(a)
(2006) (SEC, five-year staggered terms); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (NLRB, five-year stag-
gered terms).
133 See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of why this assumption is generally incorrect.
134 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 107 ("[lit was anticipated that such a commission
could formulate policy without too much regard for the policies of the administration in
power.").
135 SeeJohn H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Stops Consumer Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at
Bl.
136 See id. (quoting Republican Leader Senator Mitch McConnell as saying, "We won't
support a nominee for this bureau-regardless of who the president is" until changes,
including a change in the commission structure, are made); see also Letter from Senator
Mitch McConnell, Republican Leader, to President Barack Obama (May 2, 2011) (on file
with authors) ("[T] he Senate should not consider any nominee to be CFPB director until
the CFPB is properly reformed. We urge the adoption of the following reforms: Establish a
board of directors to oversee the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.").
137 More Calls for a Commission, Not a Director, at the CFPB, COMMITTEE ON FIN. SERVICES
BLOC (Oct. 21, 2011), http://financialservices.house.gov/Blog/?postid=265286.
38 Opponents offered their insistence on a different structure for the CFPB as the
justification for their refusal to confirm a new head for the agency. Because the agency
could not act without a head, the structural disagreement might have solely been designed
to kill the agency.
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It is not clear how much more insulation from presidential con-
trol results from a multimember agency as opposed to a single-headed
agency. There is some evidence that multimember agencies are more
responsive to congressional preferences than presidential prefer-
ences. 139 During periods of divided government, partisan-line voting
increases and members in the minority dissent more.140 Professors
Adam Candeub and Eric Hunnicutt argue that these dissents are stra-
tegic and designed to send a signal to the reviewing court to overturn
the decision. 41 The impact of these dissents has not been empirically
tested, but the dissents (not possible in single-headed agencies) argua-
bly increase the chances that policy decisions will be overturned. A
larger multimember agency increases the possibility of such dissents.
This is because coalitions of dissenters are easier to build, which les-
sens the hesitation an agency member might have to being the odd
member out.14 2 Overall output of regulatory activity is also lower dur-
ing periods of divided government. 43
The limitation on presidential control gained by a multimember
structure is offset by the fact that each multimember agency has a des-
ignated head, referred to as a chair.' 44 Chairs are typically seen as a
presidential proxy because they usually hold their position as chair
(but not as members of the agency) at the will of the President. 4 5
The responsibilities and powers of the chair vary by agency, but most
chairs control the day-to-day administration of the agency, agency per-
sonnel, and the agency's agenda. 46 There is evidence that members
of the same partisan affiliation as the chair tend to vote with the
139 See Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Partisans & Partisan Commissions, 17 GEO,
MASON L. REV. 789, 809 (2010) (stating that congressional concerns dominate indepen-
dent agencies).
140 See Adam Candeub & Eric Hunnicutt, Political Control of Independent Agencies:
Evidence from the FCC 9-10 (July 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.ssrn.com/abstract=1640285 ("[W] hen a minority party commissioner's party controls
one of the houses of Congress that commissioner is less likely to affirm. Conversely, the
executive party commissioners are more likely to affirm in this situation.").
141 See id. at 13.
142 See Brown & Candeub, supra note 139, at 807 (noting that having more members
makes dissent more "possible" and more "desirable").
143 See Candeub & Hunnicutt, supra note 140, at 10, 12.
144 See Barkow, supra note 9, at 37-38 (noting that a single head may be more suscepti-
ble to presidential influence, especially when the President has the power to demote the
chair and appoint a new one).
145 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) (giving the President the power to designate one
member of the FTC to serve as Chairman); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1) (2006) (same provision
for the NLRB). But see 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (establishing a fixed four-year term for the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board).
146 See Barkow, supra note 9, at 38-39, 39 nn.125-28 (noting that the President can
remove most chairs at will and describing the powers of the typical chair).
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chair.147 This "partisan 'lockstep' behavior" allows the President to
retain influence over the decisions of multimember agencies. 1 4
But Congress can constrain the President's ability to influence a
multimember agency through the agency's chair. Congress has sev-
eral options when structuring the relationship between the chair of a
multimember agency and the President. Each of these options varies
the level of Presidential influence over the chair and therefore over
the multimember agency. Congress can delegate the selection of the
chair to the members of the agency, which limits the President's role
to the appointment of individual members.149 The intermediate
choice is to replicate the regular appointments process by allowing
the President to nominate a chair but requiring Senate consent. 50
Finally, the Senate can give the power to appoint the chair to the Pres-
ident alone,15 which allows a new President to appoint a new chair
from existing members or to appoint a new chair contemporaneously
with his or her first appointment of a member.
D. Partisan Balance Requirements
As reported in Table 4, there are partisan balance requirements
for about half of the multimember agencies, both those with statutory
removal protection and those without. Table 4 omits agencies re-
ported in Table 3 as having single-head structures because those agen-
cies will obviously not have partisan balance requirements.
TABLE 4: AGENCIES WI PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS
No Partisan Balance Requirement Partisan Balance Requirement
Statutory Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Commission on Civil Rights; CPSC; FERC;
Roc o Board; Federal Reserve; Mine Safety and FR C F NMBRemoval Health Review Commission; NLRB; FR;FC T;IA;MP;NB
Protection OSHRC; NMB, NRC; NTSB; PRc; 5TB; USS 52
ACUS; Advisory Council on Historic Pres-
ervation; Corporation for National and African Development Foundation; CFTC;
Community Service; Election Assistance Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board;
No Statutory Commission; Federal Retirement Thrift In- EEOC; Export-Import Bank; Farm Credit
Removal vestment Board; National Capital Planning Administration; FCC; FDIC; FEC; ITC;
Protection Commission; National Council on Disabili- MCC; Nat
ty; Overseas Private Investment Corpora- tion; SEC
tion; Panama Canal Commission; Railroad
Retirement Board; TVA
147 See Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Independent Agencies and the Unitary Executive
Debate: An Empirical Citique 22 (Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Pa-
per Series, Research Paper No. 06-04, 2008).
148 Id. The question of what drives voting in multimember agencies is discussed in
detail in Part III, infra.
149 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (5) (2006) (FTC); 45 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (NMB).
150 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2006) (MSPC); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(B) (2006)
(Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board).
151 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(B) (2006) (CFTC); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) (FTC).
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Partisan balance requirements limit politically motivated decision
making within an agency. 154 They ensure that different viewpoints
will be expressed-an institutional feature that Professor Sunstein ar-
gues lowers the risk that decisions will be made on a strictly partisan
basis.155 For agencies that regulate in a highly politicized environ-
ment, partisan balance requirements raise the costs to the agency for
acting in a partisan manner. Because their partisan affiliation is clear,
votes along partisan lines might decrease the legitimacy of their deci-
sion-making process by raising doubts that the agency is fulfilling its
role as an expertise-driven body.'56
Congress may also use partisan balance requirements to limit the
ability of a President to gain control over an agency through the pro-
cess of attrition and appointment.15 7 Professor Daniel Ho, in an em-
pirical study on the effects of partisan balance requirements, argues
that such requirements do constrain the President's ability to use his
appointment power to staff agencies with members who share his ide-
ological preferences. 58 In a study of votes in rulemaking and adjudi-
cation decisions, he found that "partisan affiliation exhibits robust
and large predictive power over votes, even holding constant the party
of the appointing president."159 Not only does partisan affiliation af-
152 42 U.S.C. § 1975(b) (2006) (Commission on Civil Rights); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(c)
(2006) (CPSC); 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (b)(1) (2006) (FERC); 5 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2006) (FLRA);
46 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (2006) (FMC); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) (FTC); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395kkk(g) (1) (E) (Supp. 2010) (IPAB); 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (MSPB); 45 U.S.C. § 154
(2006) (NMB); 42 U.S.C. § 5841(b)(2) (2006) (NRC); 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2006)
(NTSB); 39 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006) (PRC); 49 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1) (2006) (STB); 39 U.S.C.
§ 202(a)(1) (2006) (USPS).
153 22 U.S.C. § 290h-5(a)(1) (2006) (African Development Foundation); 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(a)(2)(A) (2006) (CFTC); 42 U.S.C. § 2286(b) (1) (2006) (Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board); 42 U.S.C. § 15323(b) (2006) (EAC); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2006) (EEOC);
12 U.S.C. § 635a(c)(2) (2006) (Export-Import Bank); 12 U.S.C. § 2242(a) (2006) (Farm
Credit Administration); 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) (2006) (FCC); 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(2)
(2006) (FDIC); 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(2)(A) (2006) (FEC); 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2006) (ITC);
22 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (3) (B) (2006) (MCC); 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b) (1) (2006) (National
Credit Union Administration); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (SEC).
154 See CUSHMAN, supra note 30, at 63.
155 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71,
103 (2000).
156 SeeJoshua Kershner, Note, Political Party Restrictions and the Appointments Clause: The
Federal Election Commission's Appointments Process Is Constitutiona 32 CARDOzo L. REv. 615,
619 (2010) ("[P]olitical party restrictions shield [agencies] from the appearance of impro-
priety, furthering the goal of partisan impartiality.").
157 See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE PouTics or AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL IN-
SULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BuREAuCRAcY, 1946-1997, at 46-52 (2003)
(finding that Congress employs insulating characteristics and partisan balance require-
ments more often in periods of divided government).
158 See Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan
Requirements on Regulation 3-4 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://dho.stanford.edu/research/partisan.pdf.
159 Id. at 4.
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fect votes, but the current trend suggests it also generates more nomi-
nations of more extreme partisans, which Professor Ho attributes to a
decrease in senatorial deference to presidential nominees and an in-
crease in congressional oversight.160 One limitation of his study is
that he examines only nine agencies, and only agencies considered to
be independent, rather than the full set of agencies with partisan bal-
ance requirements.16'
Partisan balance requirements are also associated with longer va-
cancy periods,162 which can affect both the outcomes and the volume
of agency activity. Cross-party nomination requirements give both
Congress and the President an incentive to game the appointments
system. For example, consider a five-member agency that currently
has four members and requires three members for a quorum. If the
term of the fourth member expires (or the fourth member resigns)
and that seat requires a cross-party nomination, the President has little
incentive to nominate a replacement, especially if the statute does not
allow the member to remain indefinitely until Congress confirms a
replacement. 6 3 Conversely, assuming that the President does nomi-
nate someone, the Senate may prefer to hold out for a better pros-
pect.16 4 It is possible then that partisan balance requirements might
lead to longer periods of operation without a full slate of members,
limiting the agency's ability to perform its functions.
E. Litigation Authority
Table 5 shows that most agencies do not possess partial or full
litigation authority. Instead, they must conduct litigation through the
DOJ. Of the agencies that do enjoy some measure of independent
litigation authority, some have statutory removal protection and some
do not. The degree of litigation authority granted varies greatly across
agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency has independent liti-
gation authority over only a few discrete violations of the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 165 whereas the FTC may represent itself in most
160 See id.
161 See id. at 8.
162 See David C. Nixon, Appointment Delay for Vacancies on the Federal Communications Com-
mission, 61 Pun. ADMIN. REv. 483, 488 (2001) (finding that vacancies in the FCC are "signifi-
cantly longer when statutory restrictions require a cross-party nomination"); David C.
Nixon & Roisin M. Bentley, Appointment Delay and the Policy Environment of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board, 37 ADMIN. & Soc'y 679, 688-89 (2006) (finding longer vacancies for
the NTSB as well).
163 See Nixon & Bentley, supra note 162, at 686 (describing appointment incentives of
the President and Congress for bipartisan commissions).
164 See id.
165 See 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)-(c) (2006) (granting relatively broad litigation authority to
the FTC).
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actions, including those before the Supreme Court if the DOJ de-
clines to represent the agency.166
TABLE 5: AGENCIES WITH FuLL OR PARTIAL INDEPENDENT
LITIGATION AuTHORiTy
No Litigation Authority Full or Partial Litigation Authority
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Statutory Board; Commission on Civil Rights; IPAB; CFPB; CPSC; FERC; FHFA; FLRA; FMC;
Removal Mine Safety and Health Review Commis- Federal Reserve; FTC; NLRB; STB;
Protection sion; MSPB; NMB; NRC; NTSB; OSC; USPS 1 6 7
OSHRC; PRC; SSA
ACUS;.African Development Foundation;
CIA; Corporation for National and Com-
munity Service; Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board; Department of Agriculture;
Department of Commerce; ED; DOE;
HHS; DHS; HUD; DOJ; Department of the
Interior; Department of the Treasury; VA;
Election Assistance Commission; FCC; Fed- C ouncil on oc PreservaDon
No Statuto eral Mediation and Conciliation Service; partment of Abor; E-
Removal Federal Retirement Thrift Investmen port-Import Bank; Farm Credit Administra-
Protection Board; GSA; Internationaltion; FDIC; FEC; ITC; Overseas Private In-Bureau; MCC; NASA, NARA; National Cap-
ital Planning Commission; National Coun- Gestmnt Corporation; Sio BEnefit
cil on Disability; National Credit Union Ad-
ministration; NEA; NEH; NSF; Office of
Government Ethics; OPM; Office of the Di-
rector of National Intelligence; Panama
Canal Commission; Peace Corps; Railroad
Retirement Board; Selective Service; U.S.
Trade and Development Agency; USAID
Since 1966, agency litigation authority has been centralized in the
DOJ.169 The default rule is that the Attorney General is to direct all
litigation to which the United States is a party "[e]xcept as otherwise
166 See id. §§ 2604(e), 2604(f), 2606 (listing specific instances in which the EPA Admin-
istrator may commence a civil action).
167 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a)-(e) (2006) (CFPB); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2076, 2601 (2006)
(CPSC); 42 U.S.C. § 7171(i) (2006) (FERC); 12 U.S.C. § 4513(c) (2006) (FHFA); 5 U.S.C.
§ 7105(h) (2006) (FLRA); 46 U.S.C. § 41307 (2006) (FMC); 12 U.S.C. § 248(p) (2006)
(Federal Reserve); 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)-(c) (2006) (FTC); 29 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 160, 161
(2006) (NLRB); 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (2006) (STB); 39 U.S.C. § 409 (2006) (USPS).
168 16 U.S.C. § 470m(b) (2006) (Advisory Council on Historic Preservation); 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2(a)(4), 13a-1 (2006) (CFTC); 10 U.S.C. § 1037 (2006) (DOD); 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(e),
663, 1852, 2005(b), 2617(e) (2006), 30 U.S.C. § 822, 2005(b) (2006) (Department of La-
bor); 22 U.S.C. § 2698(a) (2006) (Department of State); 49 U.S.C. § 507 (2006) (DOT); 15
U.S.C. § 2606 (2006) (EPA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(b), 2000e-4(g) (2006) (EEOC); 12
U.S.C. § 635(a)(1) (2006) (Export-Import Bank); 12 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (2006) (Farm Credit
Administration); 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (2006) (FDIC, as construed in FDIC v. Irwin, 727 F.
Supp. 1073 (N.D. Tex. 1989)); 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(f), 437d(a)(6) (2006), 26 U.S.C.
§§ 9010(a), 9040(a) (2006) (FEC); 19 U.S.C. § 1333(g) (2006) (ITC); 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2193(d), 2199(d) (2006) (Overseas Private Investment Corporation); 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1302(b)(1), 1303 (2006) (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation); 5 U.S.C. § 612
(2006) (SBA); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa, 78u, 78u-1, 78u-3, 78y (2006) (SEC); 16 U.S.C. § 831c(b)
(2006) (TVA, as construed in Tenn. Valley Auth. v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002)).
169 See Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 516, 80 Stat. 613 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 516).
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authorized by law."' 7 0 Congress has carved out numerous exceptions
to the centralized control of litigation in the DOJ.' 7' These excep-
tions-all related to civil, not criminal, litigation-"have been any-
thing but systematic." 72 The choice to delegate independent
litigation authority can affect both independence and policy out-
comes. So, in contrast to some scholars who view exceptions from
centralized litigation authority as haphazard, 73 one might instead
conclude that the choice to carve out an exception is a deliberate and
thoughtful one.
The effect of independent litigation authority is a degree of insu-
lation from executive control. The use of the term executive control,
rather than presidential control, is deliberate here. The Office of the
Solicitor General supervises federal government litigation in the
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. Though the Solicitor Gen-
eral serves the Attorney General and the President, decisions of the
Office are generally regarded as motivated by legal doctrine rather
than purely political rationales. 74
Centralized litigation control increases agency independence
from Congress but decreases agency independence from the Execu-
tive. DOJ officials are subject to committee oversight, but the
programmatic committees that are most likely to be upset about the
DOJ over- or underenforcement of agency priorities have little control
over the DOJ's budget or decision making.'75 The result is that by
170 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litiga-
tion in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party. .. is reserved to
officers of the Department ofJustice, under the direction of the Attorney General."); id. §
519 ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all
[such] litigation . . ."); see also id. § 518 ("Except when the Attorney General . . . directs
otherwise, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits
and appeals in the Supreme Court . . . ."); 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (2006) ("Except as otherwise
authorized by law, the head of an Executive department or military department may not
employ an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an
agency, or employee thereof is a party .. . but shall refer the matter to the Department of
Justice.").
171 As of 1978, Congress had authorized at least thirty-one executive and independent
agencies to conduct at least some of their own litigation. See Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney
General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46
FoRDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1057 (1978). By 1996, that number had increased to forty-one
agencies and government corporations with some authority over their own litigation. See
James R. Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department ofJustice Representation
of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1569, 1573 (1996).
172 Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White House, and
Agency Litigation Authority, 61 lAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 205, 207-08 (1998).
173 See, e.g., id. at 208.
174 See infta notes 266-70 and accompanying text (discussing the Office of the Solicitor
General's independence).
175 See Devins & Herz, supra note 172, at 211. In contrast, theJudiciary Committee has
a strong, concentrated interest in increasing centralization in the DOJ and thereby increas-
ing its own power. See id. at 221.
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centralizing control of litigation in the DOJ, congressional oversight
over agency enforcement is weakened. 76 In contrast, executive con-
trol over agency enforcement increases when litigation is centralized
within the DOJ.
While most policymaking does not occur in litigation,177 control
over positions taken in litigation and litigation decisions results in a
degree of control over substantive enforcement decisions. 78 First,
when agencies must rely on the DOJ to initiate litigation, at least some
of the time the DOJ will say no. This means that the centralization of
litigation control in the DOJ leads to less enforcement of laws than
agencies would prefer. 79 Second, agencies are "captive clients."180
They cannot threaten to take their cases elsewhere and therefore have
little bargaining power to convince the DOJ to take the positions the
agency wishes to take."8 Professor Margaret Lemos has studied the
impact of centralized litigation control on agency statutory interpreta-
tion positions taken before the Supreme Court.1 2 Her study ex-
amined all agencies, not just those considered independent.s83 She
argues that "some degree of [Solicitor General]-agency conflict [is
present] in roughly 27% of the cases involving agency statutory inter-
pretation."184 Control over litigation positions is significant because it
affects the substantive positions agencies can take. For example, if the
DOJ chooses to forgo an appeal or proceed on ajurisdictional defense
rather than on the merits, an agency may be left uncertain about the
scope of its authority.
176 See id. at 211.
177 See id. at 212.
178 See S. 1358-The Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act: Amendments to the
Whistleblower Protection Act: Hearing on S. 1358 Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
108th Cong. 7 (2004) (statement of Peter Keisler, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice) (listing "presidential supervision over Executive Branch policies
implicated in [the course of] governmental litigation" as one of the justifications for cen-
tralized litigation authority).
179 The reason for this is twofold. DOJ lawyers wish to avoid losing cases, which makes
them more risk averse than agency lawyers, whose goal is to advance agency priorities. See
Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department ofJustice Control of Federal Litiga-
tion, 5 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 558, 588 (2003). In addition, the DOJ also takes the position that
interagency litigation is usually nonjusticiable and will therefore block agency efforts to
enforce their own statutes against other agencies. See Devins & Herz, supra note 172, at
210.
180 Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate Over Federal Litigating Author-
ity, 68 JUDICATURE 71, 73 (1984) (quoting JUDITH V. MAY, PROFESSIONAIS AND CLIENTs: A
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 13 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181 Id.
182 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court and Agency,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 186-87.
183 See id. at 203 (examining agencies traditionally considered independent as well as
agencies traditionally considered executive).
184 Id. at 201.
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Despite centralized control of litigation, agencies retain signifi-
cant control over the enforcement of their statutory schemes. Only
litigation is centralized. Other forms of agency lawyering, such as ad-
ministrative enforcement and counseling, remain decentralized. 185
There are strong policy reasons to centralize litigation authority
that are unrelated to independence. First, centralization may be more
efficient because "the development of litigation expertise in more
than one agency [is] unnecessary duplication." 8 6 Second, centralized
control ensures consistency. When the government speaks with one
voice, particularly on issues that recur across the government, citizens
can better predict what the government's position will be.'87 Third,
centralization increases accountability because the President is ulti-
mately politically responsible for the position the government takes
on any given issue. 8 Fourth, the DOJ sees itself as a gatekeeper for
the courts with an obligation to guard against an overwhelming and
inconsistent flood of litigation. If the government took inconsistent
positions in litigation, those positions would be less credible to the
courts.'8 9 Finally, the generalist expertise of the DOJ benefits both its
agency clients and the courts.190
It is difficult to isolate the precise reason for granting indepen-
dent litigation authority in any given instance, but it is clear that the
parties involved consider the stakes of the decision whether to grant
litigation authority very high. During the Reagan administration, the
Special Counsel of the MSPB, an agency with explicit for-cause re-
moval protection, requested independent litigation authority in cases
where the position taken by the MSPB would not conflict with the
position taken by the DOJ in the same litigation.191 The request was
strongly opposed by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), the legal ad-
visor to the executive branch. 192 The OLC opinion stated that the
executive branch has a general opposition to "any legislative proposal
that would further erode the Attorney General's litigating authority
185 See Devins & Herz, supra note 172, at 213-14; Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The
Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies' Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1345,
1367-69, 1371-74 (2000).
186 Olson, supra note 180, at 78.
187 See id.
188 See id. at 78-79.
189 See Patricia M. Wald, "For the United States": Government Lawyers in Court, 61 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 122-27 (1998); cf FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 96
(1994) ("[A]n individual Government agency necessarily has a more parochial view of the
interest of the Government in litigation than does the Solicitor General's office, with its
broader view of litigation in which the Government is involved throughout the state and
federal court systems.").
190 See Olson, supra note 180, at 79-80.
191 See Auth. of the Special Counsel of the Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. to Litigate & Submit
Legislation to Con., 8 Op. O.L.C. 30, 31-32 (1984).
192 See id. at 30-31.
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under 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 & 519."193 For that reason, President Ronald
Reagan eventually pocket-vetoed the bill that would have enacted the
MSPB's suggestions. 194
F. Congressional Comments, Legislative Proposals, and Budget
Authority
As reported in Table 6, the authority to avoid centralized review
of congressional testimony, legislative proposals, and budget submis-
sion is present in about half of the agencies with statutory removal
protection and slightly fewer than half of agencies without statutory
removal protection. For agencies marked by an asterisk, a subcabinet
level component possesses the authority.
TABLE 6: AGENCIES WITH FuLL OR PARTIAL BYPASS AUTHORITY
No Bypass Authority Full or Partial Bypass Authority
Statutory Commission on Civil Rights; FLRA; FMC; CFPB; Chemical Safety and Hazard Investi-
Removal FTC; IPAB; Mine Safety and Health Review gation Board; CPSC; FERC; FHFA; Federal
Protection Commission; NLRB; NMB; NRC; OSHRC Resry MSPB; NTSB; OSC; PRC; SSA;
ACUS; African Development Foundation;
CIA Corporation for National and Com-
munity Service; Department of Agriculture;
Department of Commerce; DOD; ED;
HHS; DHS; HUD; DOJ; Department of La-
bor; Department of State; Department of
the Interior; VA, FCC; Election Assistance Advisory Council on Historic Preservation;
Commission; EPA; EEOC; Export-Import CFTC; Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Bank; Federal Mediation and Conciliation Board; DOE*; Department of the Trea-NO Statutory Service; GSA; International Broadcasting sury*; DOT*; Farm Credit Administration;
Roecton Bureau; MCC; NASA; NARA; National Cap- FDIC; FEC; Federal Retirement Thrift In-ital Planning Commission; National Coun- vestment Board; ITC; National Credit
cil on Disability; NEA; NEH; NSF; Office of Union Administration; Jilroad Retire-
Government Ethics; OPM; Office of the Di- ment Board; SBA*; SEC1 6
rector of National Intelligence; Overseas
Private Investment Corporation; Panama
Canal Commission; Peace Corps; Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation; Selective
Service; TVA; U.S. Trade and Development
Agency; USAID
19 Id. at 32.
194 See Ronald Reagan, Memorandum of Disapproval on a Bill Concerning
Whistleblower Protection, 1988-1989 PuB. PAPERS 1391, 1391-92 (Oct. 26, 1988).
195 12 U.S.C. §§ 5492(c) (4), 5497(a) (4) (e) (2006) (CFPB, self-funded, bypass author-
ity); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(R) (2006) (Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
concurrently to Congress); 7 U.S.C. § la(10) (A)-(B) (2006) (CPSC, concurrently to Con-
gress); 42 U.S.C. § 7171(j) (2006) (DOE must send both FERC's budget request and
DOE's request for FERC to Congress, comments, proposals, and testimony concurrently to
Congress); 12 U.S.C. § 250 (2006) (FHFA, bypass authority for comments, proposals, and
testimony); 12 U.S.C. §§ 247, 250 (2006) (Federal Reserve, full report of operations to
Congress, bypass authority for comments, proposals, and testimony); 2 U.S.C. § 1204(k)-(l)
(2006) (MSPB, budget and proposals concurrently to Congress, bypass authority for testi-
mony and comments); 49 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (2006) (NTSB, budget concurrently to Con-
gress, bypass authority for comments, proposals, and testimony); 5 U.S.C. § 1217 (2006)
(OSC, comments, proposals, and testimony sent concurrently to President); 39 U.S.C.
§ 2009 (2006) (PRC, self-funded); 42 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1) (A) (2006) (SSA, budget submit-
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Centralized review of budget proposals, congressional testimony,
and legislative proposals is a relatively new development in the admin-
istrative state. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 empowers the
President to require agencies to submit budget requests for inclusion
in a comprehensive budget proposal.197 The 1939 amendments to the
Act explicitly included the independent regulatory commissions and
boards, which had claimed to be exempt by virtue of their indepen-
dence. 98 In the wake of the Humphrey's Executor decision, several
agencies claimed to be exempt from OMB budget control. Congress
quickly responded to the President's request for help in making it
clear that independent agencies were covered. 99
The OMB has implemented the statute through Circular A-11,
which sets out a complex process of coordination, review, and clear-
ted by President to Congress without revision); 49 U.S.C. § 703(g) (2006) (STB, concur-
rently to Congress); 39 U.S.C. § 2401 (e) (2006) (USPS, budget submitted concurrently to
Congress).
196 16 U.S.C. §§ 470r, 470t(b) (2006) (Advisory Council on Historic Preservation,
budget concurrently to Congress, bypass authority for comments, proposals, and testimony
but if voluntarily submit to OMB review, revisions must be identified); 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(a)(10)(A)-(B) (2006) (CFTC, concurrently to Congress); 42 U.S.C. § 2286h-1 (2006)
(Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, recommendations, and testimony concurrently to
Congress); 42 U.S.C. § 8820(c) (2006) (DOE, must identify initial request along with its
request, comments, proposals, and testimony concurrently to Congress for Office of Alco-
hol Fuels); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7802(d) (5), 7803(c)(2)(B) (2006), 12 U.S.C. § 5343(d) (2006)
(Department of Treasury, IRS budget submitted without revision to Congress, National
Taxpayer Advocate report submitted to Congress, Office of Financial Research has bypass
authority for comments, proposals, and testimony); 49 U.S.C. § 48109 (2006) (DOT, Fed-
eral Aviation Administration budget, comments, proposals, and testimony concurrently to
Congress); 12 U.S.C. §§ 2250, 2252(a)(3) (2006) (Farm Credit Administration, self-
funded, comments and proposals submitted directly to Congress in annual report); 12
U.S.C. § 250 (2006) (FDIC, budget included in annual request submitted concurrently,
bypass authority for comments, proposals, and testimony); 2 U.S.C. § 437d(d) (2006)
(FEC, concurrently to Congress); 5 U.S.C. § 8472(i)-(j) (2006) (Federal Retirement Thrift
Investment Board, concurrently to Congress); 19 U.S.C. § 1330(e)(4) (2006) (ITC, sub-
mits budget to Congress on or before date President does); 12 U.S.C. §250 (2006) (Na-
tional Credit Union Administration, comments, proposals, and testimony submitted
concurrently to Congress); 45 U.S.C. § 231f(f) (2006) (Railroad Retirement Board, budget
concurrently to Congress, bypass authority for comments, proposals, and testimony); 15
U.S.C. § 634f (2006) (SBA, reports of Chief Counsel submitted to President and Congress
without review); 12 U.S.C. § 250 (2006) (SEC, bypass authority for comments, proposals,
and testimony).
197 31 U.S.C. § 1108(b) (1) (2006).
198 See Strauss, supra note 12, at 589 n.60.
199 With respect to title II of the bill, under the decision in the Humphrey case,
we had something new to appear down here in respect of some of these
agencies. They shrugged their shoulders and said, "We are not under any
budgetary control," quoting that case .... Title III provides help for the
President, not this President but all Presidents. It is not up to us to ques-
tion or quibble about what the Executive needs in the way of help.
84 CONG. REC. 2315 (1939) (statement of Chairman Lindsay C. Warren).
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ance of budget requests.200 Professor Strauss describes presidential
coordination of the budget process as "one in which the agencies gen-
erally cooperate and from which they receive benefit as well as occa-
sional constraint."2 0 1 Centralized budget control allows the President
to produce an "annual review, from a fiscal perspective, of the govern-
ment's overall priorities and plans."202 At the same time, the relation-
ship between independence from the President and OMB budget
control is clear: "[I]t cannot be denied that there is a direct relation
between budget control and policymaking."203
Congress has exempted several agencies from this baseline rule.
No agency is entirely exempt from the consolidated budget process,
though some agencies are required to submit their budget requests to
Congress at the same time they submit their requests to the OMB. 20 4
For other agencies, the President must include in his budget an inde-
pendent statement by the agency of what it requested from the
OMB2 05 These bypass procedures have several consequences. First,
they decrease presidential control over the agencies' agendas by de-
creasing the information asymmetry between Congress and the Presi-
dent.2 0 6 Second, independence from the President during the budget
process may result in these agencies receiving less funding than other
agencies because the President's support is a determinant of success
in the budget process.207
200 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR No.
A-11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2011), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/all_current_year/a_1 1_201 I.pdf.
201 Strauss, supra note 12, at 589.
202 Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 194.
203 Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of Constitu-
tional Issues That May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 Amz. L. REv. 1199,1219 (1981);
see also 115 CONG. REc. 1836 (1969) (statement of Everette Macintyre, FTC Comm'r)
("What was intended as a purely housekeeping measure not infrequently has become an
instrument of control over policy.").
204 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437d(d) (2006) (requiring that the FEC submit budget requests
concurrently to Congress and the OMB); 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(10)(A)-(B) (2006) (same for the
CFTC).
205 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 904(b) (2006) (requiring that in each annual request for ap-
propriations by the President, the President include a statement by the SSA showing the
amount requested and providing an assessment of budgetary needs); 49 U.S.C. § 703(f)
(2006) (same for the STB).
206 Professor David Lewis has argued that agencies with indicia of independence, in-
cluding exemption from the OMB budget clearance process, are more durable because
they produce outcomes closer to Congress's preferences. See David E. Lewis, The Adverse
Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The
Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 BRIT. J. POL. Sa. 377, 389-90, 400-02 (2004).
207 See KennethJ. Meier, The Impact of Regulatory Organization Structure: IRCs orDRAs?, 3
S. REv. PUB. ADMIN. 427, 438 (1980) (finding that from 1970 to 1976, dependent regulatory
agencies (DRAs) received an average 12% increase in their budgets while independent
regulatory agencies (IRCs) received only a 5% increase); Christopher G. Reddick, IRCs
Versus DRAs: Budgetary Support for Economic and Social Regulation, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN.,
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Presidents have consistently opposed these exemptions. In 1972,
the CPSC became the first agency able to submit budget requests con-
currently to the President and Congress.20 When signing the legisla-
tion, President Nixon protested the provision and urged Congress not
to pass similar provisions in the future. 209
The OMB's authority to review and clear legislative comments,
recommendations, and testimony stems not from a statute, but from
Circular A-19. 2 1 0 The Circular was created under the Nixon adminis-
tration and was later substantially revised by the Carter administra-
tion.211 The need for coordination, from the President's perspective,
followed from "an episodic pattern of direct communications from
executive staff to Congress, accompanied by fairly regular assertions
by their superiors that it ought to stop."2 1 2 The Circular covers "[a]ll
executive branch agencies .. . except those agencies that are specifi-
cally required by law to transmit their legislative proposals, reports, or
testimony to the Congress without prior clearance."213 "Agency" is de-
fined broadly to cover all executive departments, independent agen-
cies, and government corporations. 214 The Circular requires agencies
to submit "proposed legislative program [s] " and "proposed legislation
or report[s] or testimony" for OMB coordination and clearance, and
it sets forth detailed procedures for agency submissions and the incor-
poration of OMB comments.215 Professor Harold Bruff has noted
that the Circular "has generally been effective, although members of
Congress grumble about it regularly and leaks undermine it."216
Winter 2003, at 21, 47-48 (finding that IRCs received less budgetary support in social regu-
latory fields than DRAs, but not in economic fields).
208 See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Independent Commissions and Political Responsibility, 27
ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1975).
209 See id. at 7.
210 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCuLAR No.
A-19, REVISED LEGISLATIVE COORDINATION AND CLEARANCE § 4 (1979), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars-a019.
211 See Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90
IOWA L. REv. 601, 659, 688-89 (2005). Attempts by the Executive to require clearance for
legislative comments and proposals date from the 1920s. See generally Richard E. Neustadt,
Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, 48 Am. POL. Sa. REv. 641, 643-47
(1954) (describing the history of financial clearance requirements, beginning with Presi-
dent Warren G. Harding in 1921 and continuing through the terms of President Calvin
Coolidge and President Herbert Hoover).
212 Harold H. Bruf, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
461, 479 (2010).
213 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 210, §4.
214 See id. § 5(b) ("Any executive department or independent commission, board, bu-
reau, office, agency, Government-owned or controlled corporation, or other establishment
of the Government, including any regulatory commission or board and also the municipal
government of the District of Columbia.").
215 Id. §§ 6(a), 7(a); see id. §§ 6-9.
216 Bruff, supra note 212, at 479.
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Congress has apparently acquiesced in this practice. By statute,
Congress has granted some agencies bypass authority, meaning that
no executive branch entity can require review, but Congress has re-
quired others to submit any material given to the OMB concurrently
to Congress.217 In the former case, the 0MB cannot demand revi-
sions but can still comment independently on the agency's submis-
sion. In the latter case, the OMB subjects the agency's materials to
review, but Congress has the agency's original submission to use as a
benchmark. 218 just as with budget proposals, these bypass provisions
decrease presidential control over agencies because they allow Con-
gress to receive information that has not been vetted to reflect only
the administration's views.
G. Adjudication Authority
Table 7 reports the agencies that possess at least some authority
to proceed through formal adjudication.219 It confirms an assertion
fairly common in the literature that the authority to proceed through
adjudication is common and not limited to agencies with statutory re-
moval protection. 220
217 The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has taken the position that concurrent submis-
sion requirements "may breach the separation of powers by disrupting the chain of com-
mand within the executive branch and preventing the President from exercising his
constitutionally guaranteed right of supervision and control over executive branch offi-
cials." As a result, the OLC construes those provisions as "applying only to 'final' recom-
mendations that have been reviewed and approved by the appropriate superiors within the
executive branch, including [the] OMB, and if necessary, the President." Common Legis-
lative Encroachments on Exec. Branch Auth., 13 Op. O.L.C. 248, 255 (1989). This lan-
guage was softened, though reaffirmed, by President William Clinton's OLC. See The
Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124,
173-75 (1996) ("[T he presumption should be that the executive branch will object to any
concurrent reporting provision in proposed legislation.").
218 See Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1152.
219 Some agencies included in our study possess neither adjudication nor rulemaking
authority. For example, the Administrative Conference of the United States produces for-
mal recommendations for improving the federal administrative process. These regulations
do not have independent force; rather, the goal is for the relevant actors to voluntarily
adopt the recommendations. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-596 (2006).
220 See, e.g., Edward R. Murray, Note, Beyond Bowsher: The Comptroller General's Account
Settlement Authority and Separation ofPowers, 68 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 161, 175 (1999) ("[M] any
executive agencies legislate through rulemaking and also perform judicial functions
through the adjudication of cases."); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative
State, 72 CArF. L. REv. 1044, 1157 (1984) (noting that "the court-like process of adjudica-
tion is often carried out by executive agencies").
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TABLE 7: AGENCIES WIH ADJUDICATION AUTHORITY
No Adjudication Authority Full or Partial Adjudication Authority
statutory Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation CPSC FERC; FHFA FMC; Federal Reserve;
Removal Board; Commission on Civil Rights; IPAB; mission; NLRB; NRC; OSHRC; PRC; STB
Protection NMB; OSC CFPB; FLRA; MSPB; NTSB; SSA; USPS22
FDIC; ACUS; Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation; African Development Foun-
dation; CIA; Corporation for National and
Community Service; Department of Com-
merce; DOD; DHS; HUD; Department of
State; Department of Treasury; EAC; Ex-
port-Import Bank; Farm Credit Administra- CFTC; Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
tion; Federal Mediation and Conciliation
No Statu Service; Federal Retirement Thrift Invest- BOard ; Department of icut r;
Removal ment Board; GSA; International Broadcast- Department of the Interior; DOT; VA;
protection ing Bureau; MCC; NASA; NARA; NationalCapital Planning Commission; National AdmEOC;aFCC; FEC; Ntoa eit
Council on Disability; NEA; NEH; NSF; Of- Unin t ; E i
fice of Government Ethics; OPM; Office of
the Director of National Intelligence; Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation; Pana-
ma Canal Commission; Peace Corps; Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation; Rail-
road Retirement Board; TVA, U.S. Trade
and Development Agency; ITC; USAID
Both agencies with statutory removal protection and agencies
subject to at-will removal may proceed through adjudication.223 In ad-
dition to issuing roughly 4,500 rules per year, agencies engage in at
least several hundred formal adjudications per year and around
500,000 informal adjudications per year, of which at least several hun-
dred are regulatory as opposed to enforcement matters. 224
221 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c)-(g) (2006) (CPSC); 42 U.S.C. § 7 17 1(g) (2006) (FERC); 12
U.S.C. § 4581 (2006) (FHFA); 46 U.S.C. § 41304 (2006) (FMC); 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2006)
(Federal Reserve); 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (FTC); 30 U.S.C. § 823(d) (2006) (Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission); 29 U.S.C. §§ 155, 160 (2006) (NLRB); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2201(c) (2006) (NRC); 29 U.S.C. § 661 (2006) (OSHRC); 39 U.S.C. § 504(f) (2006)
(PRC); 49 U.S.C. § 722 (2006) (STB); 12 U.S.C. §§ 5492(a) (10), 5563 (2006) (CFPB); 5
U.S.C. § 7118 (2006) (FLRA); 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2006) (MSPB); 49 U.S.C. § 1131 (a)
(2006) (NTSB); 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2006) (SSA); 39 U.S.C. § 5005 (2006) (USPS).
222 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (CFTC); 42 U.S.C. § 2286b(a) (2006) (Defense Nuclear Facili-
ties Safety Board); 7 U.S.C. § 6997 (2006) (Department of Agriculture); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232h(f) (2006) (ED); 42 U.S.C. § 7193 (2006) (DOE); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2006)
(HHS); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006) (DOJ); 29 U.S.C. § 2936 (2006) (Department of Labor);
30 U.S.C. § 1275 (2006) (Department of the Interior); 49 U.S.C. § 336 (2006) (DOT); 38
U.S.C. § 7102 (2006) (VA); 40 C.F.R. pt. 124 (2006) (EPA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006)
(EEOC); 47 U.S.C. § 154(j) (2006) (FCC); 2 U.S.C. § 437g (2006) (FEC); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1786(b) (2006) (National Credit Union Administration); 13 C.F.R. § 134.102 (SBA); 15
U.S.C. § 78w (2006) (SEC); 50 U.S.C. app. § 471a (2006) (Selective Service).
223 See Kenneth C. Cole, Presidential Influence on Independent Agencies, ANNALs Am. AcAD.
POL. & Soc. Sc., May 1942, at 72-73 (noting that independent boards, independent com-
missions, and traditional executive agencies all exercise quasi-adjudicative and quasi-legis-
lative functions).
224 See Steven P. Croley, Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regu-
latory Government 102-03, 108-11 (2008).
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Rulemaking and adjudication are not wholly separate spheres.
Rulemaking tends to be initiated by an agency and results in forward-
looking, generally applicable rules. Adjudications can be initiated ei-
ther by the agency, as with enforcement proceedings, or by parties, as
with licensing proceedings or disputes arising under a statute. In the-
ory, adjudication simply resolves private disputes. In practice, how-
ever, "[a]gencies, like courts, frequently evolve detailed and precise
rules in the course of adjudication."2 2 5 The relationship between how
an agency chooses to develop policy and the potential for political
influence over that policy therefore has less to do with anything inher-
ent in the two forms of policymaking and more to do with the rules
that developed to govern those forms.
Administrative law doctrines permit less political interference in
the form of ex parte contact during formal adjudication than during
informal adjudication, notice-and-comment, or rulemaking (which is
how agencies conduct virtually all rulemaking).226 So agencies with
the authority to proceed through adjudication rather than rulemak-
ing are more insulated from the President and interest groups. An ex
parte contact is an "oral or written communication not on the public
record with respect to which reasonable prior notice to all parties is
not given," 227 meaning that political influence can go unnoticed. The
cost of influencing an agency decision rises when ex parte contacts are
prohibited-because unlawful contacts can result in an agency action
being vacated-and when ex parte contacts must be disclosed-be-
cause the political cost of influencing an agency decision rises.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prohibits ex parte con-
tacts after an agency initiates a formal adjudication.228 An interested
person outside the agency is barred from making or causing to be
made an ex parte communication to an agency decision maker that is
relevant to the merits of the proceeding, and if such prohibited com-
munication is made, the agency must disclose it.229 In contrast, the
APA does not contain rules on ex parte contacts during an informal
225 David L. Shapiro, The Choice ofRulemaking or Adjudication in the Development ofAdmin-
istrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921, 926 (1965).
226 See Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REv. 889, 901 (2008) ("Most rulemaking occurs
through 'informal' mechanisms, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking. . . ."); Kathryn
A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 66
n.287 (2009) ("Rulemaking today, however, overwhelmingly takes place under the rubric
of informal notice-and-comment rulemaking, not formal rulemaking.").
227 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (2006).
228 See id. § 557(d) (1) (A). This rule applies to formal regulation as well, but there are
almost no formal rulemaking proceedings today, so we do not discuss them. See Watts,
supra note 226, at 66 n.287.
229 See5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1).
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rulemaking.230 However, courts have imposed some constraints on in-
formal rulemaking based on due process and the requirement that an
appellate court rely on the whole record when reviewing an agency
action.231 Furthermore, legislation or regulations governing an indi-
vidual agency may specify additional controls or prohibitions on ex
parte contacts.232 There are no uniform procedures governing ex
parte contacts during informal adjudication.
Of course, agencies may go further than the requirements of the
APA and promulgate stricter ex parte contact rules for formal and
informal adjudication and rulemaking. Those rules bind the
agency2 33 but may be revised at the agency's discretion. The FCC, for
example, has a Sunshine Rule that governs ex parte contact during
rulemaking and rules governing ex parte contact during adjudica-
tion. 2 3 4 As a result of this ability to promulgate stricter rules, an
agency's ability to proceed through formal adjudication is one of the
weaker indicia of independence because an agency that is permitted
to proceed only through rulemaking could promulgate rules gov-
erning ex parte contact to insulate its decision making to a similar
degree.
230 See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2280 n.142 (noting that "[t]he APA contains no
prohibitions on ex parte contacts between agency personnel and outside persons in notice-
and-comment rulemaking"); Watts, supra note 226, at 48 ("The APA expressly regulates ex
parte contacts in the context of formal adjudications and formal rulemakings required to
be conducted on the record but not in the context of informal notice-and-comment
rulemakings.").
231 See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56-59 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (requir-
ing ex parte contacts to be docketed in the rulemaking record after the agency gives notice
of a rulemaking). But see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 402-05 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding that not all informal ex parte contacts must be docketed in the informal rulemak-
ing record).
232 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(j) (2006) (prohibiting ex parte contacts in Federal Trade
Commission informal hearings); 14 C.F.R. § 300.2 (1983) (prohibiting contact between
interested parties and Civil Aeronautics Board employees until after final disposition of
proceedings).
233 Cf Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389
(1932) (noting that an agency may not ignore its own rules in subsequent proceedings and
retroactively apply a new rule).
234 In all proceedings at the FCC, a certain period ("the Sunshine Period") is desig-
nated in which all presentations to Commission decision-making personnel are prohibited.
This period
begins with the issuance of a public notice one week before the public
meeting at which the Commission will consider an NPRM or final rule. Un-
less an exemption applies, outside parties-other than members of Con-
gress and other federal agencies-may not make presentations, oral or
written, on items that will be considered at the public meeting once the
Sunshine Notice is issued.
Rulemaking Process at the FCC, FCC (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/rule
making-process-fcc. For more detailed guidance on acceptable conduct during the Sun-
shine Period, see generally Ex Parte Rules (2011), FCC (May 26, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/
encyclopedia/ex-parte-rules-201 1.
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Adjudication also allows agencies to conduct policymaking in a
less visible form than rulemaking. Agencies that act through adjudica-
tion can choose policy-making vehicles from a steady flow of enforce-
ment actions, unlike the regulation process, which agencies must
initiate when they decide to change policy. In describing the benefit
of proceeding through adjudication rather than rulemaking, one for-
mer EEOC Commissioner said, "[T]he more overt the policymaking,
the more endangered the agency's independence [is]. Better to make
policy through adjudication and prosecution. It is safer because [it is]
incremental and you present a moving target."235 The authority to
proceed through adjudication grants agencies the authority to choose
which actions they wish to shield from outside influence, which in
turn allows agencies greater flexibility to create policies as they see fit.
This Part demonstrated that the structural features most com-
monly associated with independence are not unique to agencies
whose heads enjoy statutory removal protection. By dividing agencies
into those with explicit statutory for-cause removal protection and
those without, it showed that each of the features most often associ-
ated with independent agencies are present in executive agencies as
well. It therefore confirmed a statement sometimes made, although
never properly proven, in the literature that "there is no distinctive
character of independent agencies."23 6
At this point, two questions remain. First, leaving aside agency
design, to what extent do independent agencies and executive agen-
cies function differently in practice? Second, what theory of presiden-
tial control flows from the observation that agencies fall on a spectrum
ranging from more independent to less independent rather than in a
binary categorization? Parts III and IV take up these questions in
turn.
III
INDEPENDENT AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES:
A FUNCrONAL ANALYSIS
Whereas Part II demonstrated that the formal division of agencies
into the binary categories of independent and executive agencies is
untenable, Part III aims to show that the functional difference between
independent and executive agencies is overstated.
235 Symposium, Independent Agencies-Independent from Whom?, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 491,
516 (1989) (statement of R. Gaull Silberman, former Vice-Chairman, EEOC).
236 Peter P. Swire, Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94
YALE L.J. 1766, 1772 (1985).
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A. Independence of Executive Agencies
The traditional description of an executive agency is one that is
subject to plenary control by the President, subject to the limits of the
authorizing statute. However, while some may argue that the Presi-
dent can and should exercise complete control over the administra-
tive state,2 3 7 practical and political considerations limit the ability of
the President to control executive agencies.
1. Political Costs of Political Control
The argument that a President's ability to remove an agency head
translates to a robust ability to control the actions of that agency head,
though perhaps intuitive, is flawed. That the President exerts some
influence over the administrative agencies is undeniable. But in order
to effectively control these decisions of an agency, or even to influ-
ence a particular agency decision, the President must bear certain
costs. Then-Professor Elena Kagan described the relationship be-
tween the agencies and the President as "a typical principal-agent di-
lemma."23 8 The President must monitor agency activity to know when
an objectionable decision needs to be cut off at the pass. Arguably,
executive orders allowing centralized review of regulations decrease
these monitoring costs, though only to the extent that OIRA acts as a
"fire alarm" to flag actions the President may be interested in.239
Given the massive output from the modem administrative state and
the President's competing non-bureaucratic priorities, Kagan argues
that "no President can hope (even with the assistance of close aides)
to monitor the agencies so closely as to substitute all his preferences
for those of the bureaucracy."240 It follows then that the President will
be able to discover, and attempt to influence, only a small, politically
salient set of agency decisions.241
Once the President decides he does want to influence an agency
head, the threat of removal is an imperfect tool for enforcing his pref-
erences.242 First, agency heads can push back by publicizing the at-
237 Proponents of the unitary executive theory make this argument. See CALABREsI &
Yoo, supra note 47, at 4 (asserting that all nonlegislative and nonjudicial officials exercise
power by a delegation of constitutional authority from the President and thus are "all sub-
ject to the [P]resident's powers of direction and control").
238 Kagan, supra note 24, at 2273.
239 We borrow the fire alarm analogy from Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. Sc. 165, 166
(1984).
240 Kagan, supra note 24, at 2273.
241 See Cole, supra note 223, at 77 (arguing that the number of issues in which the
President is personally invested or over which his delegates will exert influence is small).
242 This is not to say that removal is never an effective tool. As Professors Pildes and
Sunstein note: "[Aln agency head who rejects the President's policies knows that he is
risking his job. For this reason, and because of the general understanding that the Presi-
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tempted interference. Presidents often prefer to use agencies as a
political shield by defending controversial decisions as the product of
agency expertise, even if there was political influence during the deci-
sion-making process.24 3 The risk that an agency head may publicly
link an agency decision to the President may deter some presidential
involvement. Second, most agency heads develop support that insu-
lates them to some degree from the President's removal power. The
agency head's support-which could be from Congress, interest
groups, or interpersonal relationships-raises the political cost of re-
moving the official.2 4 A President will not exercise the removal
power "if the agency head's regulatory agenda imposes fewer political
costs than firing him would."2 4 5
An agency head can also use his or her political support to im-
pose costs on the President, reversing the traditional direction of po-
litical control.24 6 By analogy then, a President will not oppose an
agency head's decision unless the agency head's decision will impose
higher costs than the President's public opposition to the agency head
will. Of course, an agency head will generally have less influence over
the President than the President does over the agency head. For ex-
ample, in 1975, President Ford was forced to choose between vetoing
a bill to regulate union picketing at construction sites and risking the
almost certain resignation of his Secretary of Labor, John Dunlop. 247
After promising to support a compromise negotiated by Dunlop, Pres-
ident Gerald Ford reversed his position and vetoed the bill to avoid
alienating Republicans who might support Ronald Reagan in the up-
coming presidential primary.24 8 Dunlop's threat to resign, and even-
tual resignation, imposed clear costs on President Ford; the President
dent is in charge of the executive branch, agency heads will generally follow the President
on matters of importance." Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 25.
243 See Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for Lawlessness,
17 KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y. 362, 369-70 (2008) ("The appointment process has allowed
presidents to use agencies as a means for major-and often unpopular-policy changes.").
244 See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2274 (" [T] he President often cannot make effective use
of his removal power given the political costs of doing so."); see also Strauss, supra note 12,
at 590 ("An administrator with a public constituency and mandate, such as William Ruckel-
shaus, cannot be discharged-and understands that he cannot be discharged-without
substantial political cost." (footnote omitted)).
245 McGinnis, supra note 24, at 918.
246 For a discussion of various examples of how resignation threats can affect presiden-
tial policy, see Robert V. Percival, Who's in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority
Over Agency Regulatoiy Decisions, 79 FoRDHAm L. REV. 2487, 2496-500, 2510-11, 2523-28
(2011).
247 See Ford Faces Decision on 'Common Situs Picketing,'NASHUA TELEGRAPH, Dec. 18, 1975,
at 13 (noting that President Ford was weighing the costs of strikes and losing conservative
votes against the costs of risking a Dunlop resignation and antagonizing organized labor).
248 See Lee Dembart, President Intends to Veto Construction Picketing Bil, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
23, 1975, at 1 (noting that President Ford felt he had no choice but to veto in the face of
Ronald Reagan's opposition to the bill).
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directly addressed the Dunlop issue in his veto statement and organ-
ized labor was openly hostile to the President in response to the
veto. 249
In 1980, the resignation of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had a
clear impact on the Carter presidency. Vance opposed a rescue at-
tempt during the Iranian hostage crisis and resigned after the attempt
failed. 250 The failed attempt was described as the last straw in an un-
derlying disagreement over the administration's military-focused for-
eign policy.2 5' The resignation, which was the "first resignation of
conscience by a Secretary of State in [sixty-five] years," "puncture [d]
the atmosphere of political solidarity" for President Carter in the wake
of the failed rescue attempt.25 2 The resignation was described as stra-
tegic, designed to send a signal to the public about the risks of
Carter's foreign policy.25 3 After news of Vance's resignation, Presi-
dent Carter faced a flood of criticism with respect to foreign policy.254
It was at least partially successful: Edmund Muskie succeeded Vance as
Secretary of State.255 Muskie's appointment was a win for Vance, as
Muskie shared his views and was also seen as more likely to win politi-
cal battles within the administration.256
2. Serving Multiple Masters
The ability of agency heads to adopt policies somewhat indepen-
dently of presidential monitoring and control matters only if agency
heads will diverge from the President's preferences in the absence of
direct presidential control. One might ask why the preferences of an
agency head would ever diverge from those of the President who ap-
pointed him, given that the President presumably appoints agency
249 See Gerald R. Ford, Statement Announcing Intention to Veto the Common Situs
Picketing Bill, 1975 PUB. PAPERS 742, 743 (Dec. 22, 1975) (explaining the reversal of his
position after giving "private assurances" to Dunlop and despite "the good faith efforts" of
Dunlop); Philip Shabecoff, Dunlop, in Quitting Labor Post, Sees a Loss of Trust After Veto, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1976, at 1 (reporting that every labor representative on the President's
labor-management advisory board quit after the veto and that the head of the AFL-CIO
"made it clear that organized labor could no longer cooperate with the Ford
Administration").
250 SeeJim Anderson, Vance Says Iran Mission Was Last Straw in Rift, PrrrSBURG PRESS,
June 6, 1980, at A10.
251 See id.
252 Hedrick Smith, A Political Jolt for Carter: White House Fears That Resignation of Vance
Could Cut Away Earlier Support for Iran Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1980, at Al.
253 See Editorial, Mr. Vance and His Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1980, at A22 (concluding
that Vance's resignation was timed to raise red flags about the direction of American for-
eign policy).
254 See Bernard Gwertzman, The State of State Is Weary, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1980, at E2
(describing the widespread perception that the National Security Council had won over
the President after years of "guerrilla warfare against State").
255 See id.
256 See id.
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heads who share his policy preferences. But the President is not the
only "principal" of an agency head. Congress, political parties, regu-
lated interest groups, and the agency staff exert influence on the
agency head.2 57
Congress primarily exerts influence over agency heads (and pre-
sumably also conveys the preferences of the political parties) through
the power of the purse. Thus "[an] agency has an incentive to shade
its policy choice toward the legislature's ideal point to take advantage
of that inducement."25 8 The preferences of members who serve on
the agency's appropriations committee will presumably carry more
weight than those of Congress generally. Congress also can influence
agencies through hearings and legislative proposals.
Political parties also influence agency heads and can cause an
agency head to diverge from the President's preferences. Because
agency heads tend not to retire from public life after their tenure,
they therefore consider the impacts of their decisions on future career
prospects. 25 9 Agency heads will consider the preferences of their po-
litical party, which controls (or at least influences) their potential for
advancement. Decisions that will "optimize the agency head's future
stream of income and reputational benefits will not necessarily be
compatible with the [P]resident's agenda at all times."260
Interest groups also exert influence over agency heads. The phe-
nomenon of interest group influence is commonly referred to as
agency capture. The capture thesis recognizes that because interest
groups representing regulated entities tend to be overrepresented in
the agency decision-making process compared to interest groups rep-
resenting public interests, the outputs of agencies will tend to be bi-
ased in favor of those interests. 261  Interest groups are
overrepresented in agency decision making because they are well or-
ganized, well funded, possess an information advantage over the
agency, and can offer perks such as future employment.262
Finally, agency staff members are able to influence agency heads
as a result of several factors. First, "government administrators will
seek employment at an agency because of an ideological identification
with that agency's mission."263 Then, as agency heads serve in their
257 See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2273 (describing a "multiprincipal structure" that cre-
ates a "welter of cross-pressures").
258 Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 Am. J.
POL. Sci. 588, 602 (1989).
259 See McGinnis, supra note 24, at 918-19.
260 Id. at 919.
261 See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1713.
262 See Barkow, supra note 9, at 21-24 (listing the reasons that interest groups tend to
be overrepresented in the agency decision-making process).
263 Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1300 (2006).
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positions, they gain expertise and "adopt the preferences and perspec-
tives of agency careerists on policy issues"-called "going native."2 6 4
Finally, the agency staff simply spends more time with the agency head
than the President or his advisors can.2 65
3. Practical Independence
Some offices, while not structurally independent, are still under-
stood to be independent, or to be best operated independently from
the President. For example, the Solicitor General of the United States
"is a member of the executive branch and owes a duty to his govern-
mental clients,"266 but is still said to have "an affirmative duty both to
the Court and to the legislature."267 Indeed, the official legal position
of the OLC, considered the legal voice of the executive branch, is that
the Office of the Solicitor should be independent of political con-
trol.2 6 8 Such a tradition of independence may create a feedback loop:
the efficacy of the Office will be judged by reference to its indepen-
dence, and Solicitors General may accept the position on the assump-
tion that they will be allowed to operate with relative independence.
The extent to which the Office has fulfilled this ideal of indepen-
dence is the subject of debate.26 9 But the example demonstrates that
structural indicia of independence are not a necessary condition of
functional independence. 270
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is another executive
agency that has enjoyed a great deal of practical independence from
presidential influence. The FDA is located within the HHS and is re-
sponsible for regulating the safety of food, drugs, cosmetics, tobacco,
and medical devices. 271 The head of the FDA does not enjoy for-cause
264 David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive
Theory of Political Contro, 14 YALE J. ON REc. 407, 431 (1997).
265 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("An overworked ad-
ministrator exposed on a 24-hour basis to a dedicated but zealous staff needs to know the
arguments and ideas of policyrnakers in other agencies as well as in the White House.").
266 Lemos, supra note 182, at 190.
267 Todd Lochner, Note, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the
Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 79 VA. L. REv. 549, 565 (1993).
268 See Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney Gen.: Role of the Solicitor Gen., 1 Op.
O.L.C. 228, 229-31 (1977).
269 See Lemos, supra note 182, at 187-92 (summarizing the debate).
270 See id. at 216 ("[E]mpirical research has revealed substantial differences in the fil-
ings of different SGs serving under the same President. Those findings strongly suggest
that the SG has at least some discretion to pursue his own agenda."); see also Margaret
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General's Changing Role in Supreme
Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1323, 1382 (2010) (conducting an empirical study and
concluding that "there is little cause for concern that the Solicitor General is too officious
in entering private controversies, or . .. cases that present highly-charged political issues
but only marginally affect the federal government").
271 See B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 85 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 801, 812-13 (1991).
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removal protection. Yet the agency, through the power of its reputa-
tion as an effective watchdog agency, enjoyed a degree of practical
independence from political and interest group pressure.272 Like the
Office of the Solicitor General, the practical independence of the
FDA has fluctuated over time. For example, in 2011, HHS Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius overruled the FDA's approval of the sale of Plan B,
a contraceptive pill, to adolescents without a prescription.2 73 This was
the first time an HHS Secretary had used her statutory authority to
overrule a drug-approval decision by the FDA.2 7 4 The unprecedented
nature of Secretary Sebelius's decision-and the sharp public criti-
cism that resulted 275-indicates that a tradition of independence can
still insulate agencies from presidential control, even if only to a lesser
degree than statutory indicia of independence.
B. Dependence of Independent Agencies
Just as traditional executive branch agencies operate with a cer-
tain degree of independence from the President, independent agen-
cies are often reasonably responsive to presidential influence.
Independent agencies are also responsive to other actors, such as
Congress and interest groups. Our point is simply that independent
agencies are influenced by the same set of actors as executive agen-
cies, a set that includes the President.
1. Appointment of Independent Agency Heads
The President appoints the heads of almost all independent
agencies, the chairs of multimember agencies, and the administrators
of single-head agencies. 276 The appointment power matters because
these agency heads generally control the agenda of the agencies; that
is, they have control over agency output and can limit agency actions
that the President might oppose. The chairs of multimember agen-
cies have been granted budget, personnel, and agenda control by stat-
ute.27 7 On paper, the chair is the chief executive and administrative
272 Cf DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHAR-
MACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 213 (2010) (describing the increased statutory au-
thority provided to the FDA in 1962-and further secured by implementing regulations in
1963-over final approval of drugs in the wake of the thalidomide incident).
273 See Daniel Carpenter, Op-Ed., Free the FD.A., N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 2011, at A35.
274 See id.
275 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Overruled on Availability of After-Sex Pill, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2011, at Al (reporting reactions to HHS Secretary Sebelius's decision to overrule
the FDA).
276 See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text for a description of the various ways
Congress can structure the Chair-appointment process, and see notes 126 and 127 for a
catalogue of the appointment process of agency chairs.
277 See Paul R Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE. L.J.
257, 265.
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officer of the agency, though some statutes require participation of
the full agency, at least when there is disagreement.278 Because there
is no judicial or executive forum to resolve intra-agency management
disputes, chairs are often able to assert their authority when there is
ambiguity or a gap in the enabling statute.279 Most support for the
argument that the position of the chair influences agency output (and
the transitive argument that presidential influence over the chair can
impact agency output) is anecdotal.280 Professor Ho conducted a sur-
vey of FCC experts to determine whether empirical studies based on
voting records that point to the power of the chair are accurate.28s He
found that formal voting studies might not capture the full set of
levers the chair uses to exercise control over an agency, for example
"alternative channels to voting, such as supervisory authority over
staff, agenda control, oversight over expenditures, and the power to
represent the Commission publicly."28 2
The chair of a multimember agency usually holds the position of
chair-but not as a member of the agency-at the will of the Presi-
dent. After removal of an existing chair, the President can then ap-
point a new chair with preferences closer to his.28 3 The ability of the
President to retain policy influence through the selection of the chair
is important because, as explained above, the "chair of a [multimem-
ber] agency is ordinarily its most dominant figure."284 While there is
room for debate, it is clear that the ability to appoint the head of an
independent agency allows the President to retain some control over
that agency's activities. An appointed chair will align with the Presi-
dent for multiple reasons. First, appointees might wish to be reap-
pointed, and the President's power to withhold renomination "casts
its shadow" before renomination. 2 8 5 Second, an appointee might
278 See Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1166-72 (surveying and describing statutes that
govern chairs).
279 See id. at 1176-78 (citing anecdotal evidence of chair control in the absence of
statutory guidance).
280 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM.
J. POL. SC. 197, 208-12, 217-18 (1982) (noting the influence of chairmen on the NLRB,
FTC, and SEC); Wood & Waterman, supra note 271, at 807-16 (analyzing the agency out-
put under the guidance of different commissioners of the FTC, NRC, FDA, and NHTSA).
281 See Daniel E. Ho, Measuring Agency Preferences: Experts, Voting, and the Power of Chairs,
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 334-39 (2010). These studies typically link the number of times
the chair is in the majority with chair power over the agency. See, e.g., Jack H. Knott, The
Fed Chairman as a Political Executive, 18 ADmIN. & Soc'v 197, 207-09 (1986) (evaluating the
"power" of Federal Reserve Board chairman by comparing the average number of dissent-
ing votes per meeting from chairman to chairman).
282 Ho, supra note 281, at 360.
283 This is most true for agencies whose chairs the President can appoint without Sen-
ate confirmation. See supra notes 126-27.
284 Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1164.
285 See Cole, supra note 223, at 74 ("Only individuals who have no ambition to succeed
themselves in their present jobs can be uninfluenced by this fact."). It is not only a desire
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want access to the political rewards that come with being on the head
of a political party's good side, such as support in a run for office or
support for a placement in a higher-level federal position or in the
private sector.286 Third, the President might have greater control
over these appointments than he does over, for example, judicial ap-
pointments. This is because the tradition in judicial appointments of
deference to the Senator whose state the court sits in does not ap-
ply.28 7 There is some evidence that confirms these intuitions. Profes-
sor Glen Robinson, a former FCC Commissioner, has written that the
regulatory agendas of both independent and executive agencies "fit
closely with presidential programs in the Ford, Carter[,] and Reagan
administrations and yet did not require close presidential control" to
do so. 2 8 8 He suggests that the appointment power is a very effective
tool of control, especially when favorable actions by agencies are then
codified by presidentially supported legislation. 289 For all of these rea-
sons, it is not surprising that "consultation and coordination on gen-
eral policy issues of national interest naturally occurs" between the
President and the chair.290
2. Appointment Frequency
Presidents gain control over independent agencies more quickly
than a formal reading of the enabling statutes would predict. One of
the motivations behind for-cause removal protection is stability: the
President will be faced with at least some holdover appointees and will
not be able to exert influence over independent agency action until
the agency head's term expires (or until enough terms on a multi-
member agency expire for the President to have a voting majority).
The FCC, whose five members serve five-year staggered terms, is a
helpful example. 291 One term will expire each year, so if all members
serve out their terms, it will take three years for the President to ap-
point a majority. The presence of a bipartisan requirement compli-
cates the picture slightly,29 2 but the basic point holds. However,
to continue serving in a current position that might motivate officials to placate a Presi-
dent; an official might desire appointment to a position in a traditional executive
department.
286 See Glen 0. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Preroga-
tive, 1988 DunE L.J. 238, 245-46 (arguing that the absence of removal power does not
eliminate the President's ability to influence agency heads or their incentives to follow the
President's preferences).
287 See Cole, supra note 223, at 74-75.
288 Robinson, supra note 286, at 249-50.
289 See id.
290 Strauss, supra note 12, at 591.
291 See 47 U.S.C. § 154(a), (c) (2006).
292 If there is a bipartisan requirement, the President may need to replace only one or
two members (assuming his party is currently in the minority).
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because of early resignations, the President is able to gain control
much earlier in practice. Members of independent agencies often re-
sign when a President of the opposing party is elected.293 For exam-
ple, the Chairman of the SEC typically resigns both the chairmanship
and the commission seat upon the election of a new President.2 94
Members of independent agencies also may choose not to serve out
their full terms.295 A study of turnover in independent agencies from
1945 to 1970 found that turnover occurs "twice as fast within the
twelve months after a new president takes office than later on," and
the rate is higher when there has been a change in party control of
the presidency.296 Finally, the President can apply pressure short of
removal to convince a member of an independent agency to resign
before the expiration of his or her terms.2 9 7 When John C. Doerfer
came under fire for his contacts with broadcast network executives
while serving as Chairman of the FCC, there was "no doubt ... that if
the President gave the word, Mr. Doerfer's resignation would be forth-
293 See Moe, supra note 280, at 200 ("[C]ommission chairmen have tended to resign
from their commissions (not simply from the chairmanship) upon losing presidential sup-
port, bolstering the [P]resident's effective power of removal."). But see Neal Devins &
David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional
Design, 88 B.U. L. REv. 459, 497 (2008) (arguing empirically that opposition-party commis-
sioners serve out most, if not all, of their terms).
294 See Floyd Norris, Levitt To Leave S.E. C. Early; Bush To Pick 4: Chairman Is Critical of
Reform Opponents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at Cl (Arthur Levitt, appointed by President
Clinton, resigned a month after the election of George W. Bush); E. Shiver, Jr., Arthur
Levitt jr. Is Clinton's Pick To Head SEC, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1993, at D2 (Richard Breeden,
appointed by President George H.W. Bush, resigned within four months of President Clin-
ton taking office); Jesse Westbrook, Cox Quits at SEC, Leaves Schapiro To Restore Clout (Up-
date2), BLOOMBERG.COM (Jan. 21, 2009,8:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=email en&refer=&sid=aJuH2AuRdpnA (Christopher Cox, appointed by President
George W. Bush, resigned his chairmanship and commission on the day President Obama
took office); see also Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies: Government's Scourge or Salvation?,
1988 DuKE L.J. 286, 288 n.6 (1988) ("Upon a change in administration, the Chairman of
the SEC is expected to tender his resignation to the new President. However, neither he
nor the other commissioners are required to resign their posts.").
295 Cf Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82
S. CAL. L. REv. 913, 919 n.23 (2009) (citing a GAO study reporting that the median tenure
for Senate-confirmed appointees-including both executive and independent agencies-is
2.1 years).
296 Charles T. Goodsell & Ceferina C. Gayo, Appointive Control ofFederal Regulatory Com-
missions, 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 291, 301 (1971).
297 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.EC.'s Embattled Chief Resigns in Wake of Latest Political
Storm, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2002 at Al ("Mr. Pitt announced his resignation just before 9
o'clock as polls were closing nationwide. For days, he had insisted he would continue to
serve as long as he had the confidence of the president .... Administration officials said
tonight that Mr. Bush had not requested Mr. Pitt's resignation but that White House offi-
cials welcomed it."); see also Barkow, supra note 9, at 30 ("[O]fficials typically voluntarily
accept a presidential request for their resignation or otherwise fail to challenge their
removal.").
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coming."298 Doerfer eventually resigned at the request of President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, despite his insistence that he had done noth-
ing improper.2 9 There is no authoritative tally of resignations due to
political pressure from the White House, but the Doerfer incident and
others like it3oo demonstrate that Presidents can use informal pressure
to speed up turnover of agency heads. Once a President's appointees
control an agency, presidential influence on those appointees oper-
ates in the same way as presidential influence on an agency chairman
or head.
3. Interaction with the Executive Branch
There are good reasons for all agencies-no matter what degree
of statutory insulation from presidential influence they enjoy-to give
up some independence and seek input from the President or his
aides. Agencies "need goods the President can provide: budgetary
and legislative support, assistance in dealing with other agencies, legal
services, office space, and advice on national policy."301 To the extent
that agencies wish to operate in the public interest, the President can
offer an important perspective on the impact of the agencies' policy
proposals. 302 The President (or his aides) may also have valuable po-
litical advice for the agencies, as he can describe the other actions his
administration is pursuing and how receptive the relevant constituen-
cies will be to the agency's action.303 And there are even more infor-
mal mechanisms of presidential influence, such as personal
connections.30 4 Therefore, agencies thought to be independent "can
298 William M. Blair, Conduct of F C.C Chief Is Studied by White House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1960, at 1.
299 See William M. Blair, Doerfer Resigns as FC.C. Chairman at President's Bid: Quits While
Under Fire for Trip on TV Official's Yacht, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1960, at I (reporting that
Doerfer's refusal to change his behavior led to a "White House summons" from which
Doerfer left "with the clear understanding that the letter of resignation would be forthcom-
ing within twenty-four hours").
300 Another example, though unconfirmed, is the resignation of Paul Volcker as Chair
of the Federal Reserve in 1987 due to pressure from the Reagan administration. While
Volcker did not publicly state that he resigned due to direct pressure from the administra-
tion, it was widely reported that President Reagan's appointees clashed with Volcker and
that their ability to outvote him and his allies played a role in his decision to resign. See
Paul Blustein, Tense Fed: Volcker's Fate Is Seen Hinging on Two Men New to Reserve Board, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 20, 1986, at 1; William R. Neikirk, Volcker Resigns As Fed Chief: Reagan Turns to
Greenspan, CmI. TRIB., June 3, 1987, at Cl (noting that, as Chairman, Volcker stuck to a
rigid policy "despite considerable political heat from Congress and, at times, Reagan ad-
ministration officials").
301 Strauss, supra note 12, at 594.
302 See id.
303 See id. ("[Agencies] understand that the view they bring to policy issues is intention-
ally specialized ... and that the President is in a position to learn and appreciate the views
of other responsible agencies, and to supply a useful broader perspective.").
304 See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2376 (noting other mechanisms, including lesser sanc-
tions, institutional incentives, and personal ties).
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be susceptible to substantial presidential oversight."305 To give just
one example, Rosalie ("Ricky") Silberman, who served as a Commis-
sioner and Vice-Chairman of the EEOC, noted that the President's
preferences had a deterrent effect on the agency's annual regulatory
agenda submissions. As she explained, agencies "tend not to put on
those lists things that are controversial, because if you do, then you're
going to get problems."306
Agencies with removal protection often interact with agencies
that do not have removal protection, and the agency without removal
protection can transmit the President's policy preferences, even if
only indirectly. This interaction takes two forms. First, authority over
a certain policy space is sometimes delegated to more than one
agency. For example, the FTC and DOJ both have roles in antitrust
enforcement,307 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the
EPA both have roles in regulating radiation,3 0 8 and the Department of
Treasury and the Federal Reserve both have roles in ensuring finan-
cial stability.309 This overlapping authority results in a need for coor-
dination, which gives the President an opportunity to assert his
influence.3 1 0 Even delegation of simply related authority, such as the
related agendas of the DOJ and the FTC can present opportunities for
presidential coordination.311 Second, if agencies deadlock and dis-
pute jurisdiction, the "usual course is to put the matter before [the]
OMB, which [attempts] more informally to bring the agencies to an
understanding."312 The OMB can take that opportunity to mediate a
305 Strauss, supra note 12, at 594.
306 Symposium, supra note 235, at 504.
307 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (allowing the FTC to engage in antitrust enforce-
ment), with Exec. Order No. 13,519, 3 C.F.R. 60,123 (2009) (granting power to a task
force, consistent with the powers of the Attorney General, to investigate unfair competition
cases and to engage in outreach to detect and enforce antitrust violations).
308 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 5844 (2006) (establishing the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regu-
lation within the NRC, which is involved in evaluating transportation and storage of radio-
active material to prevent radiation hazard), with id. § 4364 (specifying the Office of
Radiation Programs within the EPA to research and develop regulatory programs for radia-
tion activities).
309 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 5214 (2006) (establishing the Financial Stability Oversight
Board within the Department of the Treasury to supervise the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram), with id. § 248 (enumerating the powers of the Federal Reserve Board to include
investigating and supervising the financial condition of Federal Reserve banks and notes).
310 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 89, at 1178-81 (offering the annual regulatory
agenda process run by the OMB as an example of how a "President can seek to promote
coordination across the executive branch and, to a limited extent, among independent
agencies").
311 See id. at 1146 ("In theory, the agencies could execute their missions separately. Yet
since they are parts of a larger enterprise, they would be more effective if their policies
were consistent.").
312 Strauss, supra note 12, at 588.
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policy resolution that is in line with the President's preferences or
conclude that the executive agency has jurisdiction.3 13
Part II demonstrated there is no neat structural divide between
agencies that are "independent" and agencies that are "executive."
This Part demonstrated that there is also no neat functional divide
between the two types of agencies. Part IV now takes up the theoreti-
cal implications of this new understanding of the complexities of
agency independence.
IV
REJECTING THE EXECUTIVE/INDEPENDENT DIVIDE:
A NEW THEORY OF PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
This Article has shown that the term "independent agency" is
both vaguely defined and fundamentally flawed. The structural fea-
tures associated with independence are present in many executive
agencies, and an agency's practical degree of independence from
presidential influence depends on many functional considerations.
Part IV builds on these findings to offer a new theory of presidential
control of administrative agencies. We first explain why the current
view that independent agencies have a separate constitutional status is
incorrect. Congress can impose constraints on the President's Article
II authority by statute.314 But statutory constraints on the President's
control over an agency do not give rise to a different constitutional
status for the agency and are not generative of further constraints that
lack a statutory basis. We then present our thesis: there is no such
thing as an "independent agency." Instead, all agencies fall on a spec-
trum ranging from most insulated from presidential control to least
insulated. The President's power with respect to any given agency is
313 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 89, at 1201 n.312 ("Interagency coordination facili-
tates the President's ability to arbitrate interagency disputes and can help him extend his
reach to independent agencies that he may otherwise not be in a position to control.").
For example, in the 1970s, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), whose members enjoy
for-cause removal protection, and the EPA, whose administrator does not, were involved in
a "series of conflicts .. . over their respective regulatory authority" in the area of radiation
standards. These disputes were referred to the OMB, which sided with the AEC. See RiCH.
ARD BURLESON STEWART &JANE BLOOM STEWART, FUEL CYCLE TO NOwHERE: U.S. LAW AND
PoucY ON NucLEAR WASTE 33-34 (2011) (describing the development of the jurisdictional
conflict between EPA and AEC, and OMB's role in resolving the dispute).
314 Congress can only limit the President so much before running into constitutional
troubles. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (noting that the relevant
question is whether a limitation "impedels] the President's ability to perform his constitu-
tional duty"). The scope of permissible limitations that Congress can place on the Presi-
dent is beyond the scope of this Article.
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determined by reference to the agency's enabling statute. Finally, we
take up three applications of this theory.
A. Rejecting the Binary View in Favor of the Continuum View
Agencies are created by statute. Therefore, the statutory text is
the best indicator of congressional intent with respect to how much
control the President has any given agency. It should be clear by now
that Congress has a menu of options when creating an agency. Con-
gress deploys these various options when designing an agency to struc-
ture the agency to be more or less insulated from presidential control.
The typical approach of the literature on administrative agencies is to
survey the landscape, note the haphazard distribution of indicia of
independence, and conclude that there is "no coherent theory of why
agencies have been designed to be executive or independent in any
particular case."s15 These pieces ignore the fact that the haphazard
distribution, which can be seen in Table 8, points to a different theory
of administrative agencies.
TABLE 8: AGENCIES BY NUMBER OF INDICIA OF INDEPENDENCE
Number of Indicia Agencies
7 CPSC; FERC; STB; USPS
6 CFTC; FEC; SEC; Federal Reserve; FLRA; FMC; FrC; MSPB; NTSB; PRC
5 CFPB; FHFA; NLRB; NRC; Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board; EEOC; FarmCredit Administration; FDIC; ITC; National Credit Union Administration
NMB; Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; Commission on Civil
4 Rights; IPAB; Mine Safety and Health Review Commission; OSHRC; SSA; AdvisoryCouncil on Historic Preservation; DOT; Election Assistance Commission; Export-
Import Bank; FCC
OSC; African Development Foundation; Federal Retirement Thrift Investment
3 Board; MCC; Overseas Private Investment Corporation; Railroad Retirement Board;
SBA, TVA
ACUS; Corporation for National and Community Service; Department of Labor;
2 DOD; DOE; DOJ; EPA; National Capital Planning Commission; National Council
on Disability; VA
Department of Agriculture; Department of State; Department of the Interior; De-
partment of the Treasury; DHS; HHS; NEA; NEH; NSF; Office of Government Eth-ics; OPM; Panama Canal Commission; Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation; Se-
lective Service
CIA; Department of Commerce; Department of Education; Federal Mediation and
0 Conciliation Service; GSA; HUD; International Broadcasting Bureau; NARA; NASA;Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Peace Corps; U.S. Trade and Devel-
opment Agency; USAID
315 Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Impor-
tance of the Debate, 1988 DuKE L.J. 223, 232; see also Miller, supra note 11, at 51-52 ("It is not
entirely clear exactly what features of the independent regulatory commissions are essen-
tial and what are merely incidental."); Strauss, supra note 12, at 584 ("[R]egulatory and
policymaking responsibilities are scattered among independent and [executive branch]
agencies in ways that belie explanation in terms of the work agencies do.").
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The binary conception of agencies as either "independent" or
"executive" is incorrect. As shown in Parts II and III, agencies cannot
be divided into two categories based on their common structural or
functional features. Of the seven structural features surveyed, none
correlates perfectly with another.316 Not all agencies thought of as
independent possess all of the indicia of independence. All of the
indicia of independence, with the exception of for-cause removal, are
present in agencies thought of as executive as well. And the indicia of
independence themselves do not come in one form, but instead have
stronger and weaker forms. The binary view forces agencies into one
of two categories even though there is no clear dividing line. In doing
so, the binary view fails to acknowledge the diversity of agency form.
Instead of falling into two categories, agencies fall along a contin-
uum. All agencies are "subject to presidential direction in significant
aspects of their functioning, and [are] able to resist presidential direc-
tion in others."317 The continuum ranges from most insulated to least
insulated from presidential control. An agency's place along that con-
tinuum is based on both structural insulating features as well as func-
tional realities. And that placement need not be static. It can shift
depending on statutory amendments or an increased (or decreased)
presidential focus on the agency's mission. On this view, an agency
gains the ability to resist presidential influence from its enabling stat-
ute, rather than from its classification.
The continuum view provides a simple answer to questions of
whether the President can take a certain action with respect to an
agency: straightforward statutory interpretation.318 The President can
take any action toward an agency that is within the scope of his Article
II powers unless an agency's enabling statute prohibits such action.
The President's ability to gain compliance by the agency will vary
based on what features the agency's enabling statute contains. For
example, it will be easier for the President to secure compliance if he
can threaten to fire the agency head, credibly threaten to reduce the
agency's budget request during the next budget cycle, or have his Jus-
tice Department refuse to represent the agency in litigation before the
federal courts. The outer bounds of presidential power (or powerless-
ness) are set by the Constitution. Congress cannot insulate an agency
to the point where the President cannot perform his Article II du-
316 All agencies with for-cause removal protection also have terms of tenure. And all
agencies with a bipartisan membership requirement are multimember agencies. Those
correlations occur by definition.
317 Strauss, supra note 12, at 583.
318 We stress that our theory is about how to approach questions of the relationship
between the President and a given agency. The answers will depend not only on the facts
but also on the interpretive philosophy-textualism, purposivism, etc.-used.
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ties.3 '9 Similarly, the President cannot go beyond his Article II powers
when interacting with an agency.3 2 0 But beyond those Article II is-
sues, other questions can and should be resolved through basic statu-
tory interpretation.
B. Debunking the Constitutional Status of Independent
Agencies
Even though the so-called independent agencies do not share a
common form, they have gained constitutional status as a "[fjourth
[b]ranch" due to enduring dicta in Humphrey's Executor.32' The con-
tent of that status is unclear, but the basic idea seems to be that be-
cause these agencies are outside the executive branch, the President
cannot constitutionally attempt to interfere with these agencies' deci-
sions. Affording a constitutionalized status to independent agencies is
improper. There is no basis for doing so, and there is no reliable way
to define what that status means or what protections it brings.
In Humphrey's Executor, the Court found that Congress's purpose
in granting the FTC for-cause removal protection was to make it to-
319 There is an ongoing debate over how much of the President's Article II powers
Congress can limit. See generally CALABRESI & Yoo, supra note 47, at 55 (arguing that the
executive power, which includes the removal power, lies completely with the President);
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153 (1992) (arguing that Congress's restriction of the execu-
tive branch is more radical than its restrictions on the federal judiciary, even though Con-
gress is supposedly coequal to both); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New
Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1346 (1994) (arguing against absolute presidential control
over the executive branch); Bruce Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President to Execute the
Laws, 46 TENN. L. REv. 757 (1979) (examining the inconsistencies between the "active
theory" of executive control and actual administrative practices, and presenting an alterna-
tive "passive theory" of limited executive supervision of independent executive officers);
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 100, at 2 (attempting to reconcile the unitary executive struc-
ture with historical framework and intent); Miller, supra note 11, at 44 (supporting presi-
dential removal power when an official has "refused an order of the President to take an
action within the officer's statutory authority"). We do not take sides on this debate in this
Article.
320 There is also an ongoing debate over the level of authority the President has to
direct the executive branch. See generally CALABREsI & Yoo, supra note 47 (discussing the
scope and exercise of the power of the unitary executive throughout presidential history);
Kagan, supra note 24 (asserting that delegation to an executive officer should be read as
Congress allowing the President to assert direct authority over agency policymaking); Les-
sig & Sunstein, supra note 100 (noting that recent case law leaves ambiguous the relation-
ship between the President, executive agencies, and independent agencies); Kevin M.
Stack, The Presidents Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267
(2006) (challenging the idea that delegations of power to executive branch officials im-
pliedly delegate that power to the President as well); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemak-
ing, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 965, 984-86 (1997) (admonishing presidents who publicly
behave as if agency "rulemakings were [their] rulemakings"). Again, we do not take sides
on this debate in this Article.
321 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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tally "free from executive control."3 22 That logic is flawed because the
Court's view of congressional purpose is not reflected in agencies' en-
abling statutes. First, as explained in Parts II.A and III.B, for-cause
removal protection does not result in full insulation from the Presi-
dent. For-cause removal still allows for removal in some cases, and the
President can influence those agencies in a whole host of ways. Sec-
ond, if Congress intended to divide the administrative state into two
types of agencies, then the matrices created in Part II would reflect
that clear division. Instead, they paint a more complex portrait of
agency design.
Humphrey's Executors logic is also underinclusive. Other indicia of
independence can have weighty implications for the relationship be-
tween an agency and the President. If for-cause removal provisions
create a separate constitutional status for some agencies, there is no
compelling reason why other indicia could not do so as well. To ar-
gue otherwise, one must demonstrate that for-cause removal is in all
instances a more significant constraint on presidential authority than
any other indicia of independence and that its presence is significant
enough to create a branch of government not contemplated by the
text of the Constitution.
One counterargument is that while for-cause removal alone may
not justify constitutional status, some other combination of features
might. But there is no combination that would capture all of the
agencies currently considered to be independent without sweeping in
a whole host of other agencies. For example, the set that possesses
two other features commonly associated with independence-a multi-
member structure and heads who serve for a term of years-includes
agencies such as the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, the
Defense Nuclear Safety Facilities Board, the Farm Credit Administra-
tion, the National Credit Union Administration, the Railroad Retire-
ment Board, and others.323 These agencies are not typically
considered independent.324 And if more features are required for in-
dependent agency status, more agencies commonly considered inde-
pendent will be left out of the set. Salvaging the binary view is simply
not worth the effort.
A further complication is that most indicia of independence have
weak and strong forms. For example, within the set of agencies that
have specified terms of tenure, the agencies with longer terms of ten-
322 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
323 See supra Tables 2-3.
324 As we have explained, there is no consensus list of agencies "considered to be inde-
pendent." So we use the Paperwork Reduction Act definition as a baseline for which agen-
cies are commonly considered independent. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2006); supra note 65
and accompanying text.
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ure are more insulated from presidential control than agencies with
shorter terms. 25 And within the set of agencies that enjoy indepen-
dent litigation authority, some agencies are permitted to initiate litiga-
tion without prior DOJ approval, some may litigate only if the DOJ
declines to litigate the case itself, and some may not litigate even when
the DOJ declines to do SO.3 2 6 If one were to ascribe constitutional
significance to a particular measure of independence, one would also
need to specify what form of that measure is sufficient to trigger con-
stitutional status.
For this reason, if for-cause removal can somehow create an entity
outside the President's Article II power, then other statutory indicia of
independence should as well. As Table 9 shows, only thirteen of the
eighty-one agencies studied have none of the seven structural indicia
of independence. Taken to its most extreme conclusion, the logic of
Humphrey's Executor would upset the traditional understanding of pres-
idential power, turning most of the administrative state into agencies
constitutionally protected from presidential control.
TABLE 9: THE DISTRIBUTION OF INDICIA OF INDEPENDENCE
ACROss AGENCIES
Number of Indicia of 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Independence Possessed
Total Number of Agencies 13 14 10 8 12 10 10 4
Some might respond, "So what?," and argue that this data simply
shows that more agencies should be considered independent than
previously were. The problem with that argument is that there must
be a basis for a default rule that favors sweeping more agencies under
the "independent" heading. The Humphrey's Executor dicta creates a
strange parallel set of constitutional default rules for agencies. For
executive agencies, the default is set in favor of presidential supervi-
sory power. This default stems from the Vesting and Take Care
Clauses in Article 11.327 To be sure, Congress can circumscribe the
325 See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
326 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (a), (f), (g) (2006) (providing that the CFTC may pursue
enforcement actions itself if it keeps the DOJ informed or may request that the DOJ pur-
sue actions on its behalf); 15 U.S.C. § 2076(b) (7) (2006) (allowing the CPSC to represent
itself only if the DOJ does not choose to do so within forty-five days of receiving a request
from the CPSC); 33 U.S.C. § 1366 (2006) (requiring the EPA to request representation by
the Attorney General in civil and criminal actions under the Clean Water Act but allowing
it to represent itself if the DOJ declines to appear); 42 U.S.C. § 7171(i) (2006) (providing
that the FERC may represent itself in all actions, except before the Supreme Court).
327 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. § 3; see CALABREsI & Yoo, supra note 47, at 316
(noting that the Vesting and Take Care Clauses "give the [P]resident power over removals
and law execution").
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President's power by statute.328 But when it does so, it must speak
clearly in order to avoid separation of power concerns.329 Courts will
construe statutes to avoid interpretations that would result in an im-
permissible encroachment on presidential power.330 For so-called in-
dependent agencies, the default is set against presidential supervisory
power. To change the default rule and erect a constitutional barrier
between the President and an agency, all Congress has to do is grant
an agency head for-cause removal protection. This barrier, though
strong, is undefined and without a basis in statute. This reversed de-
fault makes sense only if there is some competing constitutional basis
for it that is similar to the separation of powers concern that animates
the clear statement rule against interference with executive power.
To state the issue in these terms is enough to refute it.
Even if we could assume that there is some set of agencies whose
structures qualify them for constitutional status, nothing in the consti-
tutional text or the Humphrey's Executor decision offers guidance on
what level of presidential control (if any) is permissible. After
Humphrey's Executor, independent agencies came to be treated as a
"headless 'fourth branch"' of government, meant to be independent
from all Presidential control.331 The early practice of "both Presidents
and Congress [was to treat] these agencies ... as entities outside the
executive branch, whose officers the President does not supervise."332
As described in Part III.B, this early practice gave way to more active
presidential oversight of independent agencies. Presidents use tools
such as budgetary promises, publicity, and friendship to persuade in-
dependent agencies to produce policies in line with their prefer-
328 SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,J.,
concurring) ("Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their dis-
junction or conjunction with those of Congress."); see also Strauss, supra note 12, at 649
(explaining that Congress can, by statute, choose to place the responsibility for decisions
with the agency rather than the President).
329 See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) ("Out of respect for
the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find
that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the APA. We
would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the Presi-
dent's performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion."); see also
Pub. Citizen v. U.S. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 466-67 (1989) (construing the Federal Advisory
Committee Act not to apply to the DOJ's use of the ABA during the judicial nomination
process to avoid the question of whether that application would "infringe[ ] unduly on the
President's Article II power to nominate federal judges and violate[ ] the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers").
330 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 466.
331 The Brownlow Commission coined the term. See PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN.
Mcsr., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 40 (1937) (internal quotation marks omitted).
332 Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 Am. U.
L. REv. 491, 512 (1987).
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ences. 3 3 The problem is that it is unclear whether such persuasion is
constitutional given the Humphrey's Executor dicta.
The unclear nature of what constitutionally permissible actions a
President can take with respect to an independent agency was on dis-
play during the recent oral argument in Free Enterprise Fund. Chief
Justice John Roberts stated: "[I] t's very hard to find out exactly what
[the President's authority over an independent agency] is."3" Justice
Scalia argued that the President could have no interaction with inde-
pendent agencies because the "whole purpose" of an independent
agency is "to be independent from the President."335 He stated his
belief that if the President told an independent agency, such as the
FCC, that he wanted them to rule a certain way, the result would be
"an impeachment motion in Congress."336  And Justice Kennedy
asked if respondent's counsel was encouraging the President to, "on
an ongoing, daily basis, . . . instruct an independent agency what he
wants done."3 3 7 Of course, questions at oral argument are not consti-
tutional doctrine, but the questions indicate that independent agen-
cies are seen as having a constitutional status that limits the
President's ability to supervise their activities.338 The questions also
demonstrate that there is no consensus on what limits on presidential
interference come with status as a fourth branch, which is unsurpris-
ing given the slim doctrinal basis for that status.
We therefore conclude that the Humphrey's Executor dicta should
be abandoned. It rests on a flawed understanding of the ways Con-
gress insulates agencies from presidential control. The subsequent
significant expansion of the administrative state and increased com-
plexity of the President's relationships with administrative agencies
underscore the untenable logic of the Humphrey's Executor dicta. To
be clear, we are not arguing that the holding of Humphrey's Executor
should be overruled on the ground that Congress cannot constrain
the President's power over administrative agencies. That argument is
alive and kicking,339 but it is not one we endorse. The argument is
made by those who espouse the "unitary executive" theory, which
holds that Article II "is a grant to the president of all of the executive
power, which includes the power to remove and direct all lower-level
333 See supra notes 301-04 and accompanying text.
334 Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Over-
sight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861) (question of Roberts, C.J.).
335 Id. at 60.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 For academic discussions on the permissible extent of presidential influence over
independent agencies, see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
9 Judge Kavanaugh recently laid out a strong defense of the argument See In re
Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 438-48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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executive officials."340 Instead, we accept that, within limits, Congress
can by statute impose certain constraints on the President's exercise
of his Article II powers.341 Our argument is simply against fashioning
a constitutional doctrine that would bootstrap onto a statutory con-
straint a set of other constraints not specified in that statute.
C. Applications
This Article's theory of agency independence may seem at first
like a definitional quibble, but it has some important implications.
First, we believe a line of precedents that imply for-cause removal pro-
tection into silent statutes is incorrect because there is no basis for
inferring that the presence of one feature of independence indicates
congressional intent to include another. Second, agencies have no
basis for asserting independence from presidential control beyond
that granted to them by statute. Third, we believe that under the stat-
utory and constitutional arguments made above, the President clearly
may require the so-called independent agencies to participate in the
regulatory review process run by OIRA. We address each of these im-
plications in turn.
1. Wiener and Implied For-Cause Removal Protection
There is a line of cases that permits the implication of for-cause
removal protection from other statutory indicia of independence.
The assumption underlying these cases is that if an agency possesses
certain indicia of independence, Congress intended for others to exist
as well. But there is no statutory or constitutional basis for that
assumption.
In Wiener v. United States, the Court implied for-cause removal pro-
tection for members of the War Claims Commission.342 The Commis-
sion was created in 1948, and a built-in sunset provision provided for
the dissolution of the Commission three years after the time limit for
filing claims ran.3 4 3 The statute was silent on removal.344 The case
arose when President Eisenhower requested Commissioner Wiener's
resignation and removed Wiener after he refused.345 Wiener then
sued for back pay.3 4 6 The Court acknowledged that there was no
340 CAABRESI & Yoo, supra note 47, at 3-4. For a comprehensive explanation of the
theory, see generally id.
341 Determining the permissible contours of these constraints is outside the scope of
this Article.
342 357 U.S. 349, 354 (1958) (holding that the structure of the War Claims Act left "no
doubt" that Congress did not intend for the President to have at-will removal power).
343 See id. at 350.
344 See id.
34 See id.
346 See id. at 350-51.
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doubt that Congress was aware of the decision in Humphrey's Executor,
but it described Humphrey's Executor as dividing agencies into those
whose functions are executive in nature and those whose functions
require "absolute freedom from Executive interference."347 The
Court concluded that because the Commission was an adjudicatory
body and was separate from any existing executive agency, statutory
silence did not implicitly confer removal power on the President.348
Instead, the Commissioners enjoyed implicit for-cause removal
protection.
Since Wiener, lower courts have similarly assumed that the FEC
and the SEC enjoy for-cause removal protection despite the lack of a
for-cause removal provision. In SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., the
Tenth Circuit accepted the argument that the SEC is "commonly un-
derstood" to possess for-cause removal protection.349 In FEC v. NRA
Political Victory Fund, the D.C. Circuit assumed from the structure and
mission of the FEC that its Commissioners enjoyed for-cause removal
protection.350 In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the FEC's actions
on the grounds that because the agency's enabling statute did not
mention removal, the commissioners served at will. Because the
agency took enforcement actions without presidential oversight, the
plaintiffs argued that the agency was acting unconstitutionally.35 1 The
D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge and explained that the FEC was
"patterned on the classic independent regulatory agency."3 5 2 It con-
ceded that silence could mean at-will removal, but agreed with the
FEC that it could "safely assume" FEC commissioners enjoyed for-
cause removal protection because it was "implied by the Commission's
structure and mission as well as the commissioners' terms."353
These cases were incorrectly decided because their central pre-
mise-that the presence of certain features of independence is evi-
dence of congressional intent to endow an agency with other features
of independence-is wrong. As demonstrated in Part II, there is only
one feature of independence that is perfectly correlated to another:
for-cause removal protection is always accompanied by a set term of
tenure. However, the relationship does not hold in the opposite di-
rection. A set term of tenure does not always correspond to for-cause
removal protection. For example, the heads of the National Endow-
ments, the Office of Personnel Management, the FBI, the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation, and the Farm Credit Administration
34 Id. at 353.
348 See id. at 354.
349 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988).
350 See 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
351 See id.
352 Id.
53 Id.
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all serve for a term of years with no statutory removal protection.35 4
Therefore there is no statutory basis for implying for-cause removal
protection from a set term of years.
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that Congress inten-
tionally choses not to endow agencies with removal protection. With
respect to the SEC and the FCC, Congress created these agencies in
between the Myers v. United States and Humphrey's Executor decisions,
during "a time when, under this Court's precedents, it would have
been unconstitutional to make the Commissioners removable only for
cause."355 One might argue this is proof that Congress would have
included for-cause removal protection had it been able to. But of
course, the proper recourse for Congress in that case would have been
to amend the statutes, something it has done twelve times for the SEC
and twenty-one times for the FCC since Humphrey's Executor.35 6 After
Humphrey's Executor, Congress created some agencies with for-cause re-
moval protection, like the NLRB and the FERC, and some without,
like the FEC, the CFTC, and the EEOC.3 5 7 When properly viewed in
context, the presence or absence of a removal provision looks more
like a deliberate choice than a drafting error.
Yet another fact refutes the central assumption of that line of
cases. As explained above, 3 5 8 a term of tenure does affect the presi-
dent-agency relationship. It constrains presidential control over an
agency even in the absence of a for-cause removal provision. Con-
gress thus could rationally decide to give an agency the amount of
independence that comes with a term of tenure but not the additional
independence that for-cause removal protection provides.35 9
354 See supra Table 2.
355 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3183
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
356 For these numbers, we counted the number of times the provision establishing the
membership of the agency was amended since 1935, relying on the revision notes accom-
panying the current statutory provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006) (SEC); 47 U.S.C.
154 (2006) (FCC).
357 See supra Table 1.
358 See supra Part II.B.
359 Professor Adrian Vermeule, in a recent piece, argues that agencies gain indepen-
dence by "convention," meaning the history of interactions between the President and an
agency. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence 23-40 (July 10, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2103338. This is similar to our argument in Part III that agencies have functional, as
well as formal, measures of independence. He believes that Wiener should be limited to its
facts. See id. at 6. But he goes on to argue that in some cases, it is appropriate for courts to
"implicitly recognize[e]" those conventions, as he believes the Court did in the Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Board decision when it assumed that SEC Commissioners enjoy for-
cause removal protection. See id. at 41-42. We disagree. While Vermeule does not deline-
ate the contours of such an implicit recognition, it would suffer from the same problems as
implying removal protection into a statute. There is no explanation of what amount of
convention would be enough to allow a court to recognize it. Moreover, even if there were
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The cases that imply for-cause removal protection from other in-
dicia of independence are not grounded in statutory text, historical
context, or a tenable theory of congressional intent.3 6 0
2. Broader Assertions of Independence
Beyond its infidelity to statutory text and historical context, the
logic of the Wiener decision invites another problem. It gives agencies
a hook on which to hang claims of independence from presidential
control that go beyond their enabling statutes. The Wiener Court read
the dicta from Humphrey 's Executor as drawing "a sharp line of cleavage
between" agencies headed by officials removable at will and those
headed by officials removable only for cause.36 1 That "sharp differen-
tiation derives from the difference in functions between those who are
part of the Executive establishment and those whose tasks require ab-
solute freedom from Executive interference."3 6 2 As explained in Part
IV.A, this binary view of agencies is incorrect. Agencies instead fall
along a spectrum. But Wiener implies that if an agency has a for-cause
removal protection provision, it can claim for itself additional protec-
tions to achieve that "absolute freedom" from presidential control.363
Even before Wiener, agencies deployed similar logic to resist presi-
dential attempts to include them in efforts to reform the bureaucracy.
For example, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 gave the Presi-
dent the power to require agencies to submit budget requests for in-
clusion in a comprehensive budget proposal.3 6 4 As one member of
Congress noted, "[i] t was clearly the intent of Congress to include [in-
dependent agencies] within the budgetary provisions . . . ."365 Yet,
another representative stressed that some agencies cited Humphrey's
Executor and "shrugged their shoulders and said, 'We are not under
any budgetary control,' quoting that case." 66 Congress amended the
Act at President Roosevelt's request to explicitly include those agen-
cies in 1939.367 Even after that, the FTC and the SEC again asserted
the ability to present budget requests directly to Congress.368 The
an explanation, it is unclear why the courts must enforce a convention that is also enforced
through political mechanisms when there is no statutory basis for doing so.
360 For an argument that later cases have limited Wiener's precedential value, see Note,
The SEC Is Not an Independent Agency, 126 HARv. L. REv. 781, 787-90 (2013).
361 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958).
362 Id.
363 See id.
364 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
365 84 CONG. REc. 2306 (1939) (statement of Rep. John Cochran).
366 84 CONG. REc. 2315 (1939) (statement of Rep. Lindsay C. Warren).
367 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
368 See Krock, supra note 56, at 22 ("The F.T.C. Chairman construed the latitude Con-
gress assigned to his unit when creating it to cover the right of the commission to appeal to
Congress for funds the [Budget Bureau] had refused to include in an annual Presidential
budget.").
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SEC and the FTC claimed that their enforcement duties, mandated by
Congress, required certain information from businesses and indus-
tries, and therefore they were exempt from early executive branch ef-
forts to control the paperwork burdens agencies imposed on
regulatory entities under the Federal Reports Act.36 9 The OMB "was
not inclined to make a head-on confrontation,"370 but later versions of
the statute explicitly included those agencies.371 And when President
Carter proposed an executive order that would require agencies to
write regulations in plain English and submit semiannual regulatory
agendas to allow for public comment, the SEC and other so-called
independent agencies were vocal opponents. They argued that "the
order usurp[ed] Congressional powers to oversee the agencies."372
The General Counsel of the SEC wrote a twenty-four page "declara-
tion of independence" that "warned that the order could set a prece-
dent that might undermine the agency's independence."373 While we
do not take issue with agencies arguing for independence on policy
grounds, as a legal matter these arguments have no merit. Agencies
enjoy protections from presidential power only to the extent the
power is limited by Article II or the agencies' enabling statutes.
3. OIRA Review of Agency Regulations
The debate over whether the President can require so-called in-
dependent agencies to comply with executive orders governing regu-
latory review is as old as the executive orders themselves. These
executive orders contain three main requirements. First, executive
agencies must prepare and submit a cost-benefit analysis of all major
regulations to OIRA within the OMB.3 7 4 Second, executive agencies
must also develop a plan for retrospective review of existing regula-
tions.375 Third, both executive and independent agencies must sub-
mit an annual regulatory plan detailing all regulations underway or
planned for review by OIRA.3 7 6 Eight presidents have now embraced
369 See COMM'N ON FED. PAPERWORK, THE REPORTS CLEARANCE PROCEss: A REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK 43 (1977).
370 Id.
371 See, e.g., Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3502, 3507(f) (2006) (in-
cluding independent agencies but creating a process for agency bypass of OMB denials).
372 Judith Miller, Congress Resisting Plans for Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1978, at 23
(noting similar objections of the FTC, ICC, and CPSC).
373 Id.
3 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b) (6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994).
5 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 6, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). The goal of
retrospective review is to determine "whether any such regulations should be modified,
streamlined, expanded, or repealed." Id. § 6(b). A second executive order stated that the
independent agencies "should" prepare retrospective review plans. Exec. Order No.
13,579, § 2, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587, 41,587 (July 14, 2011).
376 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 642. President Clinton required
participation of the independent agencies in the regulatory planning process. See id. Presi-
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regulatory review as an important executive tool in the modern ad-
ministrative state, yet they were unwilling to require that independent
agencies comply with the regulatory review executive orders.377
The hesitation to include independent agencies in regulatory re-
view stems from two related issues. The first is the legal debate over
whether the President has the authority to review actions by indepen-
dent agencies.378 The second is the political cost of doing so in light
of the legal uncertainty, which risks provoking a fight with Congress
over control of these agencies.379 We believe the answer to the legal
question is clear. Because Congress has not by statute insulated the
so-called independent agencies from regulatory review, the President
can require them to comply with the governing executive orders. The
President can, of course, decline to do so if he decides that the politi-
cal costs of doing so are not worth the benefits. We take up each
argument in turn.
The argument against presidential authority to require indepen-
dent agencies to comply with the regulatory review executive orders
takes two forms. The first argument is that the constitutional status of
independent agencies insulates them from such control. When Presi-
dent Ford issued Executive Order 11,821 in 1974, which required
agencies to prepare "inflation impact statements" for all major regula-
tions in compliance with procedures developed by the OMB,38 0 the
executive order applied to every "executive branch agency."381 A
number of agencies refused to comply, including the CPSC, FTC,
FCC, SEC, Federal Reserve Board, ICC, ITC, and the PRC. 38 2 Their
argument for exemption was based on dicta in Humphrey's Executor
that stated that agencies with for-cause removal protection were
dent Reagan had declined to do so. See Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 323, 323
(1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (holding only executive agencies subject to the
order), repealed ty Exec, Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§601 (2006).
7 For a summary of the development of centralized regulatory review from the Nixon
administration to the Obama administration, see REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILTY Acr OF
2011, H.R. REP. No. 112-294, at 18-22 (2011).
378 See Barkow, supra note 9, at 31-32 ("It is an open constitutional question whether
the President could require traditional independent agencies ... to submit cost-benefit
analyses of proposed regulations to OIRA for review, or if Congress has the power to pre-
vent such review.").
379 See id.; see also Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Of-
fice of Legal Counsel to David Stockman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget, at 7-8 (Feb.
12, 1981), reprinted in Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 158-59 (1981) (claiming
that an attempt to subject independent regulatory agencies to cost-benefit-analysis require-
ments would be "very likely to produce a confrontation with Congress").
380 See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926, 926 (1974).
381 Id
382 See Charles W. Vernon, III, Note, The Inflation Impact Statement Program: An Assess-
ment of the First Two Years, 26 AM. U. L. REv. 1138, 1151-52, 1152 n.87 (1977).
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meant to be totally free from presidential control.383 Perhaps because
of the response of these agencies, President Carter solicited public
comments on a proposal that later became Executive Order 12,044.384
The independent agencies sharply contested the President's ability to
require them to participate.385 Members of Congress argued that in-
dependent agencies were "arms of Congress" and that the President
could not lawfully apply the executive order to them.3 86 In the end,
President Carter exempted these agencies to avoid "a confrontation
with Congress over the applicability of the order to the independent
regulatory agencies."387 The question arose again when President
Reagan expanded the regulatory review program. His Department of
Justice concluded that he could require independent agencies to par-
ticipate, but only if the Supreme Court was willing to retreat from the
Humphrey's Executor dicta that denied the President any influence over
those agencies.388 Like Carter, Reagan decided to exclude those
agencies from the scope of his executive order.389 A similar discussion
occurred during the Clinton Administration, and President Clinton
also exempted independent agencies.390 If, as we explain above, the
Humphrey's Executor dicta is wrong because it relies on a flawed binary
understanding of the administrative state, then the constitutional ar-
gument against including independent agencies in the regulatory re-
view requirements also fails.
The second argument is that any requirement would be empty
because the President could not fire the head(s) of an agency who
383 See id. at 1151-53.
384 See Moreno, supra note 24, at 494-95.
385 See supra notes 372-73 and accompanying text.
386 Summary and Analysis of Public Comments, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,665, 12,670 (Mar. 24,
1978) (noting that some members of Congress stated that the President could not subject
independent agencies to regulatory review); see also Martin Tolchin, Carter Orders Agencies to
Cut Out the Jargon, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1978, at A12 (quoting a letter from twelve "chair-
men and ranking Republican members of Senate committees that oversee regulatory is-
sues" and arguing that applying the executive order to these agencies would be unlawful
because it would "violate the intent of Congress that the executive branch not control the
rules these agencies issue").
387 Summary and Analysis of Public Comments, 43 Fed. Reg. at 12,670. The Justice
Department told President Carter that most of the executive order could be applied to
these agencies. See id.
388 See Memorandum from Larry L. Simms to David Stockman, supra note 379, at 9-12
("We believe that the foregoing constitutional and statutory analysis supports the applica-
tion to the independent agencies of those portions of the Order that would be extended to
them.").
389 Cf Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 323, 323 (1986) (requiring "each Execu-
tive agency" to submit reports to the OMB).
390 See Sally Katzen, Remarks at the Congressional Research Service Symposium on
Presidential, Congressional, andJudicial Control of Rulemaking 20 (Sept. 11, 2006) (tran-
script on file with authors) ("We reconsidered the question and chose not to do it .... It's
not one based on the law. I think we had the authority; I think it's purely a question of
desirability.").
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refused to comply because doing so would violate the for-cause re-
moval provision. One response to this argument is that failure to en-
gage in regulatory review permits removal because it is "inefficiency"
or "neglect of duty."391 Professors Robert Hahn and Sunstein have
made this argument, apparently because they view cost-benefit analysis
as a basic requirement of rational regulation. 392 However, they do
not explain why-even assuming the statutory language can be twisted
to reach this result-agency heads must comply with the President's
regulatory review program to avoid being removed instead of simply
instituting their own review program. Our argument is simpler and
flows from the theory of executive power developed in Part IV.A.
Presidents can require all agencies to participate in the OIRA-led reg-
ulatory review process because there is no statutory bar prohibiting
them from doing so. They may enforce that requirement using all of
the traditional tools of presidential oversight. It is likely that a Presi-
dent could fire an agency head who refused to comply with regulatory
review without a basis in statute,393 but we do not take a position on
that issue. In any case, the focus on removal power is unhelpful. Re-
moval is a blunt instrument. If an agency is not exempted from regu-
latory review, the President has tools other than removal, described in
Part III.B.3, to ensure that agencies comply with the regulatory review
orders.
The lack of a clear answer to the legal question raises the political
costs to the President of subjecting these agencies to the regulatory
review executive orders. Congress historically viewed independent
agencies as "arms of Congress," meaning that any attempt by a Presi-
dent to exert authority over the agencies might provoke a costly politi-
cal fight.39 4 As we have explained, Congress's position lacks a sound
legal basis, and deference to the "arm of Congress" view is unwar-
ranted. As a policy matter, it is also unsound for the President to keep
exempting independent agencies from the regulatory review pro-
gram. These agencies have issued and will continue to issue regula-
391 See Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1535 ("If agencies proceed when the bene-
fits do not exceed the costs, they might reasonably be thought to be acting
'inefficiently.'").
392 See id. at 1531-37 (concluding that inclusion of the independent agencies within
OIRA regulatory review would be lawful).
393 Cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988) (stating that a "good cause" limita-
tion on removal power still allows the President to ensure that the appointee "is compe-
tently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the
provisions of the [relevant] Act").
394 Summary and Analysis of Public Comments, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,665, 12,670 (Mar. 24,
1978); see Memorandum from Larry L. Simms to David Stockman, supra note 379, at 7-8
("[An attempt to infringe the autonomy of the independent agencies is very likely to
produce a confrontation with Congress, which has historically been jealous of its preroga-
tives with regard to them.").
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tions that impose significant costs on the economy, just as executive
branch agencies do. Not only do so-called independent agencies im-
pose great costs on regulated entities, they often do so with little analy-
sis of those costs or alternatives during the drafting process.3 9 5 If
regulatory review is a good practice for agencies traditionally consid-
ered to be part of the executive branch, as Presidents have recognized
for more than three decades, it is also a good practice for agencies
that have traditionally been regarded as independent.
One counterargument is that Congress might legislate against a
background assumption that the President could not include certain
agencies within the regulatory review program.396 Congress might not
have delegated certain powers to an agency, or might have included
additional safeguards, had it known that greater presidential involve-
ment was possible or probable.397
This counterargument comes in two forms. One assumes that
Congress created a set of agencies that it meant to be insulated from
regulatory review. As explained above, this view of congressional pur-
pose is not reflected in the agencies' enabling statutes. Congress did
not create two categories of agencies, so there is no principled basis
for stating that Congress meant for one set of agencies to be free from
regulatory review. And because no measure of independence is per-
fectly correlated to another, there is also no plausible argument that
because Congress insulated an agency in one way it also meant for
that agency to be free from regulatory review.
The other form of this argument relies on dicta from Humphrey's
Executor stating that independent agencies are totally insulated from
presidential control as a background rule. Under this version, the
395 Cf U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK Acr REGULA-
TIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION 15,
37-39 (2011) (finding that rules promulgated by independent agencies under Dodd-Frank
do not meet the standards set out in OMB Circular A-4, which "serves as best practices for
conducting regulatory analysis"); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE,
LoCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 31 (2011) (noting that it "would be desirable to obtain better
information on the benefits and costs of the rules issued by independent regulatory agen-
cies" and that the "absence of such information is a continued obstacle to transparency,
and it might also have adverse effects on public policy").
396 Cf Kagan, supra note 24, at 2327 (arguing that Congress chooses between delegat-
ing power to an executive or an independent agency based on the desired level of presi-
dential oversight).
397 This argument would apply to all pre-OIRA delegations of power to executive agen-
cies as well. Regulatory review requires a cost-benefit analysis for all major agency regula-
tions. Before regulatory review existed, Congress presumably legislated with the
background assumption that, though the President could influence executive agencies, he
did not have the capacity to do so methodically. Congress might not have delegated as
much authority to executive agencies had it known that the President would be able to
assert some greater control over those agencies (thereby decreasing congressional control
in comparison) through regulatory review.
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President could subject agencies created between Myers and
Humphrey's Executor to regulatory review because Congress was not act-
ing against that background rule, but could not subject agencies cre-
ated after Humphrey's Executor to regulatory review. But this version
has the same flaws as the first. If Congress thought that the default
rule was freedom from presidential supervision, then the statutes
would reflect that. There would be no need to exempt agencies with
for-cause removal protection from presidential legislative review or
control, for example. Because Congress did exempt some of those
agencies, the statutes more likely reflect a congressional understand-
ing that the default is set in favor of presidential control. There is no
reason regulatory review should be different. In response to past as-
sertions of executive power, such as centralized control over legislative
comments and testimony, Congress exempted some agencies by stat-
ute.398 Congress can, of course, do the same here.
The Federal Reserve presents the hardest case because it pos-
sesses almost all of the indicia of independence studied here (and
some that are not).399 The Federal Reserve's market actions do not
meet the definition of "regulations" and would not be subject to regu-
latory review, but its new duties under the Dodd-Frank Act do meet
the definition. Most believe that the Federal Reserve is designed to be
independent, so the congressional intent argument is most compel-
ling for an agency like this. But here again, a look at the statute shows
that Congress took the time to exempt the Federal Reserve from cen-
tralized presidential control over litigation and congressional commu-
nications. Again, the statute is evidence that even for an agency like
the Federal Reserve, Congress does not believe the default rule is total
freedom from presidential control. Finally, just because presidents
can assert more influence over an agency such as the Federal Reserve
under our theory does not mean that they will. If interfering with the
Federal Reserve is bad policy (and bad politics), there is little reason
to believe a President would do so.
Our argument has focused on regulatory review, but it has
broader implications for presidential management of the administra-
tive state. From centralized budget control, to centralized communi-
398 See, e.g., Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § III, 88 Stat. 1500, 1506 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 250 (2006)) (exempting the SEC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and
various other agencies regulating financial institutions from centralized clearance of legis-
lative proposals, testimony, and comments); Trade Act of 1974, ch. 36, § 175(a) (1), 88 Stat.
1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2232 (2006)) (requiring the President to submit
budget requests of the International Trade Commission to Congress without revision).
399 The Federal Reserve has an independent funding stream that does not depend on
the annual appropriations process. See 12 U.S.C. § 243 (2006). For a list of other agencies
with this feature, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-864, SEC OPERATIONS: IMPU-
CATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE FUNDING STRuCTuREs 2 (2002).
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cations with Congress, to OMB resolution of interagency disputes, to
regulatory review, the history of the presidency has been one of mana-
gerial innovation. The administrative state is large and growing, and
our hope is that future presidents will not limit their attempts to im-
prove agency oversight to only executive agencies.
We recognize that some might be troubled by our view, which
permits the President to exercise, or at least attempt to exercise, more
control over agencies that most believe should operate independently.
Our goal is to break down the binary view of agencies and to rebut the
constitutional status of independent agencies. This shift in thinking
about the relationship between the President and the administrative
agencies leaves much of the status quo in place. Imagine a scenario
where the President wants to tell an agency what to do. Under our
view, an agency that disagrees can respond in several ways. The
agency can point to a for-cause removal protection clause. The
agency can threaten to publicize the suggestions, pointing to a long-
standing tradition of independence. The agency can claim the rele-
vant statute delegates authority to the agency but not the President.400
Or the agency can simply stand its ground based on a policy disagree-
ment. In each of these cases, the President can press on and attempt
to bring the agency around to his view. Whether presidents do so will
depend on how much political capital they are willing to spend rather
than how the agency is categorized. Our view does not upend the
administrative state. It merely offers a theory of administrative agen-
cies that has a basis in statutory text rather than unfounded assump-
tions about congressional purpose.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a basic question: What is the basis for
classifying agencies as either independent or executive? It turns out,
contrary to the almost universal understanding of agencies, that there
is no binary distinction between agency types. Indeed, there is no sin-
gle feature that every agency commonly thought of as independent
shares, not even a for-cause removal provision. Agencies fall along a
spectrum ranging from more insulated to less insulated from the Pres-
ident. Once agencies are understood in this way, the flaws in the cur-
rent theory and doctrine surrounding independent agencies become
clear. There is no perfect correlation between any two features of in-
dependence, other than for-cause removal and a term of tenure, so
there is no reason to infer additional, unwritten limitations on presi-
400 See Stack, supra note 320, at 280-81, 284-91, 294-96 (arguing that Congress meant
to exclude consideration of presidential preferences from some agency decisions because
some statutes state that an agency's action is subject to presidential approval while others
do not).
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dential control from the presence of any given limitation. And there
is no reason to infer a constitutionally based measure of indepen-
dence from the presence of a statutory measure of independence.
The degree of independence from presidential control an agency en-
joys should be determined only by looking at the agency's enabling
statute.
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